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Abstract 
 
Patrick Tobin: No Country for Old Fighters:  
Postwar Germany and the Origins of the Ulm Einsatzkommando Trial  
(Under the direction of Christopher Browning) 
 
This thesis traces the origins of the 1958 Ulm Einsatzkommando Trial in West 
Germany through the postwar story of Bernhard Fischer-Schweder.  As a Nazi officer 
involved in an Einsatzkommando unit in 1941, Fischer-Schweder had taken part in the 
murder of several hundred Jewish civilians in Lithuania.  By the 1950s these crimes came to 
light.  An investigation into him triggered subsequent arrests, and by 1958, Fischer-Schweder 
and nine others found themselves at the center of the largest war crimes trial since 
Nuremberg.  By reconstructing this period through the Fischer-Schweder story, this thesis 
argues that by the mid-1950s, sectors of West German society were increasingly critical of a 
perceived apathy towards prosecuting Nazi criminals.  These pockets of progress served as a 
point of transition in West Germany’s relationship with the Nazi past, a transition which 
made the Ulm trial possible and ushered in an era of war crimes investigations in the 1960s. 
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Chapter 1 
The Camp Director of Ulm 
 June 26, 1954, was to prove a defining day in the life of Bernhard Fischer-Schweder.  
Since the beginning of the year, the fifty-year-old directed a refugee camp near the southern 
German city of Ulm.  Upon assuming responsibility for the 3,800 camp inhabitants, he 
initiated wide-ranging reforms to impose order, improve health conditions, and increase 
safety.1  His immediate successes earned him widespread respect.  After only a month, 
Fischer-Schweder was briefly but strongly considered by the regional government to take 
over leadership of the larger camp near Stuttgart.2  Even the local press noted the “fresh air” 
he brought to the Ulm camp.  Fischer-Schweder’s “purposeful and energetic” planning had 
systematically raised the quality of life in the camp.3  But all of this was for him mere 
prologue to the crowning achievement of his tenure to this point: the opening this evening of 
the new camp theater. 
 The theater put some of Fischer-Schweder’s multiple skills on center stage.  The four-
hundred seat complex was the result of his pragmatism and innovation.  Working with local 
construction firms in Ulm, Fischer-Schweder authorized the total renovation of a large horse-
stable to become the modern center of cultural life in the camp.4  The theater boasted a 
                                                 
1
 Regierungspräsidium Nordwürttemberg to Ministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte 
(10 December 1953), EL20/1 II, Bd. 1, Staatsarchiv Ludwigsburg (hereafter, SL). 
 
2
 Regierungspräsidium Nordwürttemberg to Abteilung I – Kenzleidirektion (30 January 1954), EL20/1 II, Bd. 1, 
SL. 
 
3
 “Frischer Wind auf der Wilhelmsburg”, Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung, 21 May 1954. 
 
4
 “‘Burgtheater’ wird am Samstag eröffnet”, Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung, 25 June 1954. 
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seventy-square meter stage and rows of plain wooden benches.  At half past seven this 
evening, it would open its doors to the inhabitants of the camp and members of the press.  As 
a display of Fischer-Schweder’s vision and sensibility, the theater represented his most 
significant contribution to camp life to date.  As such, Fischer-Schweder had camp personnel 
on high alert through the day to ensure that all went accordingly that evening.  
 One staff member, a camp guard named Pallmer, personally respected Fischer-
Schweder and his contributions to the camp.  He likely took extra care that day during his 
patrol of the area surrounding the camp.  At two o’clock that afternoon, as he rounded the 
corner towards the eastern entrance to the camp and looked out towards the parking lot, 
Pallmer noticed a “tall, lanky, and somewhat pale” man standing outside an automobile, 
evidently waiting for someone.5  Though the man was not a camp inhabitant, his face was 
familiar.  Loitering outside the camp was unusual and, on this day, unacceptable. 
 Pallmer approached, and with little baiting, the man with “a well-worn face” began to 
make pronouncements to Pallmer, speaking derisively about camp director Fischer-
Schweder.  Pallmer “deliberately said nothing” but “listened attentively” so as not to 
discourage the man and hear his full piece.  He stated that during Fischer-Schweder’s highly-
regarded service in the police force of Breslau, Fischer-Schweder was a member of the SS.6  
He threatened that it “would not be long” before Fischer-Schweder was fired from his 
position.7  The conversation ended when an unknown woman approached the accuser, and 
the two left together.   
                                                 
5
 Report by Pallmer (27 June 1954), EL48/2 I, Bd. 3125, SL.   
 
6
 Breslau is present day Wrocław, Poland. 
 
7
 Report by Pallmer (27 June 1954), EL48/2 I, Bd. 3125, SL. 
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Pallmer quickly submitted a report of the incident.  “I consider it necessary for me to 
inform you of this, Mr. Fischer,” he wrote, “in order to protect you from such denunciations.”  
He added, “I am extremely grieved that there are people who would want to belittle your 
successes in this camp, where you really have given so much effort and done so much.”8   
Such loyalty protected Fischer-Schweder for a time, but was to prove insufficient in 
the coming months.  He had been too important before the war, too violent during it, and too 
prominent afterwards in his new camp position.  June 26, 1954, did mark a significant day 
for Bernhard Fischer-Schweder by showing him that he could not escape his Nazi past.  Far 
from announcing his arrival and heralding a successful reemergence as a civil servant, the 
day signaled the high point of his postwar career and the beginning of his downfall.   
 This paper aims first to tell the story of this downfall: of how a man played a 
dangerous game after the war by concealing swaths of his past, while using other elements 
for personal gain, and how the rules of this game began to change around him.  It was a game 
that Fischer-Schweder would lose, and when he lost, he did so publicly and brought down 
nine others with him in what became the so-called Ulm Einsatzkommando trial of 1958, but 
what remains officially known as the “case against Fischer-Schweder and nine others.”  
These ten former Nazi officers of Einsatzkommando Tilsit found themselves convicted of 
carrying out mass executions of several thousand Jewish men, women, and children in the 
border regions of Germany-Lithuania during the summer of 1941.  The major aim then is to 
narrate this route that led Fischer-Schweder to his camp director position and ultimately to 
imprisonment.  
                                                 
8
 Report by Pallmer (30 July 1954), EL48/2 I, Bd. 3125, SL.  Pallmer kept to his promise to look into the 
matter, and by the end of July he had succeeded in identifying the man with whom he spoke, a citizen of 
Ulm, Kurt Hoyer, who had been acquaintances with camp resident Alois Meier.   
 4 
 The second goal is to use Fischer-Schweder’s story to explain the origins and 
development of the Ulm trial.  This trial emerged prominently and surprisingly in West 
Germany during the 1950s.  The largest postwar trial since the Nuremberg tribunal, the Ulm 
case represented a watershed moment in German trial history, both providing new 
approaches for the investigation and prosecution of criminals from the Third Reich and 
keying institutional changes that greatly expanded the number of such trials over the coming 
decades.  Beyond this legal context, the trial was also integral to a wider cultural shift that 
occurred towards the end of the 1950s in West Germany.  This movement away from a 
victimization narrative of the Nazi era that had largely silenced discussion of German crimes 
towards a more nuanced understanding of the past brought attention to crimes of the 
Holocaust and international suffering at the hands of Nazi Germany.  Fischer-Schweder’s life 
therefore remains central to understanding how and why the Ulm trial emerged when and 
where it did. 
 Third and finally, this paper intends to reflect on wider trends and shifts within 
postwar West German society through Fischer-Schweder’s story of deception and downfall.  
His path was unique in its whole, but in its particulars he faced the same choices, problems, 
and opportunities as wide swaths of society after 1945.  The circuitous route of his career 
therefore acts as a prism onto much larger issues in West Germany.  By studying Fischer-
Schweder’s path to downfall, avenues of insight are opened onto the nature of Nazi war 
crimes, the shortcomings of denazification, the Cold War and creation of a West German 
state, the revival of a functioning state bureaucracy, the politics of reintegration, and the 
ongoing attempts across cultural, political, and organizational lines to come to terms with the 
Nazi past.  In the chaotic aftermath of World War II, West Germany was a wilderness of 
 5 
demographic shifts, privation, and ruin.  Anyone could be who he claimed he was, and 
thousands of former Nazis found it possible to escape justice and exist on the frontiers of 
reintegration.  The story of Fischer-Schweder and the Ulm trial is therefore the story of how 
the frontiers of this West Germany were closed. 
 
The Ex-Nazi Vacuum Salesman  
 Physically, emotionally, and professionally, the immediate postwar years represented 
a constant struggle for Fischer-Schweder.  At the close of the war, he lay in a military 
hospital in Bavaria for four months, recovering from wounds sustained in fighting during the 
closing days of war in Austria.9  The shrapnel of a grenade had torn into his arms, legs, chest 
and throat.  Though he was fortunate to avoid serious organ damage, the wounds resulted in 
visible scarring and permanently reduced mobility.10   
 While the scars became a constant reminder of wartime experience, Fischer-
Schweder quickly erased other significant markings of his life before 1945, embracing his 
own version of the Stunde Null, or zero hour.  He distanced himself at once from his wife 
Charlotte, to whom he had been married since 1935.  He refused to notify her of his postwar 
location, and she resorted to her own detective work in tracking him down using the 
postmarks of his letters.11  Though briefly reunited, the two divorced in 1949.  Officially, 
they cited the reason as “mutual difficulties,” but Fischer-Schweder later suggested the cause 
                                                 
9
 Statement by Charlotte Fischer, nee Voigt (23 October 1954), EL20/1 II, Bd. 1, SL; Personalbogen, EL20/1 II, 
Bd. 1, SL. 
 
10
 Amtsärztliches Zeugnis (1 February 1954), EL20/1 II, Bd. 1, SL. 
 
11
 Statement by Charlotte Fischer, nee Voigt (23 October 1954), EL20/1 II, Bd. 1, SL. 
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was “the ongoing adultery of my wife, which had begun when I was a soldier on the front.”12  
Fischer-Schweder remarried another woman, Irmgard Kirchoff, within several months of the 
divorce, and the couple had their first child, Christian, in early 1951.13 
 Of immediate priority for Fischer-Schweder following the war was avoiding extended 
time in a denazification camp.  After recovering from his wounds, Fischer-Schweder was 
automatically interned in an American prisoner of war camp in Bavaria.  The massive 
organizational efforts that denazification required of the Allies meant that individuals were 
largely trusted to answer forms honestly; little bureaucratic slack existed for investigating 
and exposing deceit.14  To conceal his participation in the Third Reich, Fischer-Schweder 
supplied his name as Bernd Fischer and his birth date as February 13, 1904, instead of 
January 12, 1904.  As for his wartime activities, he listed his background in the civil service 
and stated that in 1941 he became Police Director in the recently reacquired city of Memel, 
near the then-German border with Lithuania, a post he held for much of the war.15  This 
version of his past and the absence of a Nazi file on anyone named Bernd Fischer born on 
that date resulted in a relatively pain-free denazification process.  On March 5, 1946, the 
                                                 
12
 Kriminalpolizei Schweinfurt to Landespolizeidirektion Nordwürttemberg-Kriminalhauptstelle (1 October 
1954), EL48/2, Bd. 3125, SL; Statement by Bernhard Fischer-Schweder (2 May 1955), EL 322 II, Bd.1, SL. 
 
13
 Personalbogen (30 November 1953), EL20/1 II, Bd. 1, SL; and Melde- und Personalbogen I (1 December 
1953), EL20/1 II, Bd. 1, SL. 
 
14
 For a succinct summary of the aims and problems with denazification, see: Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: 
Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, trans. by Brandon Hunziker (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
48-55. 
 
15
 Memel is present day Klaip÷da, Lithuania.  Memel had historically been a Prussian city, until the city and 
surrounding region were taken from Germany and given to Lithuania following World War I.  Under an 
ultimatum by Hitler, Lithuania gave the region back to Germany in 1939.  See, Gerhard L. Weinberg, A 
World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 14, 31-
32. 
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military tribunal in Bad Neustadt, a town not far from Ulm, declared him to be “unaffected” 
by Nazism.16  He rejoined society. 
 Professionally, Fischer-Schweder found himself in a difficult position.  As a West 
German who had worked in the civil service in what was now Poland, Fischer-Schweder 
could neither return physically to his old post nor find a similar position in the West.  The 
Allies had made a priority of purging the German civil service, and Fischer-Schweder was 
therefore cut adrift.17  At the same time, his strategic change in name and birth date 
successfully allowed him to avoid extended time in a denazification camp, but it also 
prevented him from trumpeting his prewar career in the police service.  By concealing his 
birth name and date, Fischer-Schweder forced himself to start his career over after the war.  
Thus, Fischer-Schweder found himself in a double bind: unable to rejoin the civil service 
(because of the Allies) and unable to capitalize off of his earlier career (because of his 
falsified information). 
As a result, Fischer-Schweder aimed low.  For the initial postwar years, Bernhard 
Fischer-Schweder lived and worked as Bernd Fischer.  To maintain a low profile and avoid 
potential inquiries into his past, he worked a series of odd jobs after that war.  He began first 
as a clerk in Bad Neustadt, until he went into business as an independent salesman in 1948.18  
His foray into self-employment ended poorly, and by January 1952, Fischer-Schweder began 
work as a vacuum salesman for a company near Stuttgart.19   Though he no doubt found sales 
less compelling than police work, the position was stable and out of the public eye. 
                                                 
16
 Spruchkammer Bad Neustadt to Bernd Fischer (9 April 1947), EL20/1 II, Bd. 1, SL. 
 
17
 Jarausch, After Hitler, 49. 
 
18
 Firma Gerhard A. Koch (undated), EL20/1, Bd. 1, SL 
 
19
 Egon Panther (10 December 1953), EL20/1, Bd.1, SL. 
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By the beginning of the 1950s, Fischer-Schweder’s metamorphosis was complete.  
He had changed his name and birth date.  Beyond his scarred physical appearance, the man 
had left his wife of previous years, had resettled in the opposite corner of Germany from his 
previous homes, and had transitioned from a civil servant of prominence to a door-to-door 
vacuum salesman.  He was able to start over in a new city with a new career, new name, and 
new family.  In his attempts to avoid denazification and postwar justice, Fischer-Schweder 
had created himself anew.  But at the very height of his reintegration, when it seemed as 
though his past had been laid to rest, Fischer-Schweder decided to risk it all. 
 
Hidden in Plain Sight 
For a number of West Germans, 1951 was a year of opportunity.  In that year, the 
Federal Republic of Germany passed an amendment to the Basic Law constitution – Article 
131.20  This amendment applied nominally to those holding civil service positions on May 8, 
1945 – the day of Allied victory over Germany – and who were purged from the ranks by the 
Allies.  In principle this allowed a number of those removed from civil service in 1945 to 
reapply or receive pensions, but in practice thousands of those formerly associated with the 
Third Reich could now apply for work in the public sector, ushering in a new era of 
reintegration under Adenauer.  New careers opened for many, and opportunists took 
advantage.  Perhaps feeling that the ghosts of the past had been laid to rest, Bernhard Fischer-
Schweder joined the fray toward reintegration. 
First, he faced a problem of his own creation: the name and birth date he had been 
falsely using on papers since 1945.  According to a later statement, Fischer-Schweder 
                                                 
20
 For a discussion of Article 131 from inception to implementation, see Norbert Frei, Adenauer’s Germany: 
The Politics of Amnesty and Integration, trans. by Joel Golb (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 
41-66. 
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brought the “trivial change” in his birth date to the attention of the local attorney in 1953, 
once denazification no longer threatened, though Fischer-Schweder seems not to have fully 
switched out of his postwar false identity.  Two key documents highlight the issue.  On 
November 30, 1953, he listed his name on an application as “Bernhard Fischer” and his birth 
date as “13 February 1904” – still using his postwar falsified information.21  However, on the 
very next day, December 1, 1953, he filled out another application, and on this, he gave as 
his name “Bernhard Fischer-Schweder” and as his date of birth “12 January 1904.”22  A 
clerical error this was not.  Unless he made the decision to change his personal information 
over during the course of that one night, Fischer-Schweder either began to use certain 
information selectively, depending on the application and audience, or had forgotten which 
identity to use. 
 The reemergence of Fischer-Schweder into public life in Western Germany began 
with his second application, dated December 1, 1953.  This was the application for 
reinstatement to the civil service in accordance with Article 131.  On it, he listed his full 
name and actual birth date.  He stated that he was born in Berlin in the borough of Spandau 
and at the age of twenty received a vocational degree as a technician.  His resume argued that 
he had been a civil servant his entire life, beginning in 1932 when he began his entry into the 
police force.  Fischer-Schweder steadily worked his way up the ranks of the detective 
division, emerging as superintendent in the eastern German city of Breslau in 1939.  By 
1940, he had been reassigned to Memel, and in 1941, Fischer-Schweder became director of 
the Memel police force.  According to the application, he saw action in the war from October 
                                                 
21
 Personalbogen (30 November 1953), EL20/1 II, Bd. 1, SL. 
 
22
 Melde- und Personalbogen I (1 December 1953), EL 20/1 II, Bd. 1, SL. 
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1943 to June 1945, which ended in a several week stay at the prisoner of war camp in Linz.  
Absent on the statement was mention of Nazi or SS membership.23  
 Within a few weeks of his application, Fischer-Schweder was asked for details about 
the “trivial change” in his name and birth date by investigators in Stuttgart.  He cleverly 
played upon simmering Cold War tensions and argued that in order to avoid “automatic 
imprisonment in and eventual deportation” to the Soviet zone after the war, he began using 
the name “Fischer” as early as 1942.24  Once this risk had passed, Fischer-Schweder notified 
officials to fix the mistake.  The change, in other words, came not as an attempt to avoid 
postwar justice, but to avoid the uncertain fate of life in a Soviet camp.  His answer allayed 
suspicions for the moment, and his application for reinstatement to the civil service was 
approved. 
 Good fortune smiled briefly on Fischer-Schweder.  His successful application had 
played a careful game with the details of his past.  He used false information to clear 
denazification, but then coupled this denazification with his real name and select details of 
his wartime experiences to gain re-admittance to the civil service under Article 131.  It was a 
house of cards construction that depended on the situation being viewed from the single 
angle Fischer-Schweder determined.  Whether hubris or ignorance factored in this decision, 
he had managed to play the game well to this point, and had won his first encounter with 
authorities.  He was rewarded one month later. 
 While the particulars of his second application were being considered, the first, dated 
November 30, 1953, began to bear fruit.  Apart from the use of his assumed name and birth 
date, the resume on this application for a civil service position in the district of North-
                                                 
23
 Ibid. 
 
24
 Statement by Bernd Fischer (12 December 1953), EL28/2, Bd.3125, SL. 
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Württemberg was nearly identical to that of the Article 131 form.  When the application of 
“Bernhard Fischer” came across their desks in early December, authorities felt that the 
“experiences of Fischer as a civil servant” seemed the perfect remedy to the “multiple and 
difficult duties” facing those in charge of the refugee camp situation in Ulm.25   
 The camp at Ulm-Wilhelmsburg had been intended to hold 2,500 refugees in the 
postwar period, but by 1953 Cold War tensions saw the camp size swell to nearly 3,800 
refugees fleeing the Soviet-dominated east.  The camp itself occupied a nineteenth-century 
fort, with imposing walls and a large enclosed commons.  To this point, the camp had been 
subsumed as a part of the larger Ulm-Römerstrasse camp, but increasingly the challenges and 
day-to-day needs of the Wilhelmsburg camp made apparent the need for an individual 
director here as well.  Since the middle of October 1953, officials had allocated funds to 
make this possible.26 
 On January 18, 1954, the vacuum salesman from Stuttgart became the camp director 
in Ulm.  As the first director of this camp, he encountered a system in disarray.  His referent 
point for order was militaristic, and he began to institute a string of effective and disciplined 
initiatives.  Guards now wore brown uniforms, and entry to the camp became limited to the 
eastern gate, where visitors would be met by residents, thereby more closely regulating travel 
to and from the compound.  Additionally, inhabitants over the age of fourteen were now 
required to carry identification papers at all times.  He began a physical renovation of the 
facilities, many buildings still in disrepair from wartime aerial bombing raids.27  When nearly 
                                                 
25
 Regierungspräsidium Nordwürttemberg to the Ministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und 
Kriegsgeschädigte, Stuttgart (10 December 1953), EL20/1 II, Bd.1, SL. 
 
26
 Ibid. 
 
27
 “Frischer Wind auf der Wilhelmsburg”, Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung, 21 May 1954. 
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forty residents fell ill shortly after he took control, he initiated measures to raise health and 
diet conditions within the camp.28  By the end of June, as noted earlier, the cultural 
renovations of the camp concluded with the opening of the camp theater.29  Encouraged by 
his successes, Fischer-Schweder moved the family to Ulm later that year.30  The future 
looked bright. 
 
The Fischer-Schweder Controversy 
 During his program of reform at the camp, an investigation into his past in the Third 
Reich began to develop.  Though he no doubt had believed that the conflicting dates on his 
applications would never intersect, eventually the twain did meet.  By summer 1954 his 
employers became aware of the conflicting birth dates on his two applications, raising fresh 
doubts about the veracity of his claims regarding wartime activities and allegiances.31  On 
August 28, 1954, at the request of the regional government of North-Württemberg, the 
Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) in 
Cologne sent a request form to the Berlin Document Center for information on potential Nazi 
or SS membership for Bernhard Fischer-Schweder, born January 12, 1904.32 
 Whatever his motivations for continuing to falsify his papers, Fischer-Schweder 
seemed to be playing a 1950s game by 1945 rules.  The massive problems facing the Allies 
and Germany at the end of the war had made it possible for Fischer-Schweder and others to 
                                                 
28
 “40 Flüchtlinge im Lager erkrankt”, Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung, 9 February 1954. 
 
29
 “‘Burgtheater’ wird am Samstag eröffnet”, Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung, 25 June 1954. 
 
30
 Bernhard Fischer-Schweder to Regierungspräsidium Nordwürttemburg (1 June 1954), EL20/1 II, Bd.1, SL. 
 
31
 Report by Regierungspräsidium Nordwürttemberg (25 November 1954), EL20/1 II, Bd.1, SL 
 
32
 Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Köln, to Berlin Document Center, US Army, Berlin (1 September 1954), 
EL20/1 II, Bd.1, SL. 
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submit false information; the bureaucratic logjam made individual verifications virtually 
impossible.  But by 1953, the bureaucratic and organizational infrastructure had been built up 
substantially in West Germany, as more groups, organizations, and political agencies existed 
that aimed to assist in the reintegration of former Nazis on the one hand and in the 
investigation of those who had bypassed denazification channels on the other.  The Berlin 
Document Center was one such agency. 
 The Center itself had only been fully operational since October 1953 but held 
millions of captured Nazi documents, including a near-total registry of Nazi and SS 
membership.33  As such, the archive provided the largest extant database for information 
regarding complicity in the Third Reich.  In 1953, as its English-language name indicates, the 
Center remained under the jurisdiction of the US Department of State.  Unlike conventional 
archives which tend to group documents by provenance, all records there were arranged by 
name, making it inefficient for those researching a given event or unit, but invaluable for 
information on individuals.  When authorities accessed the archive for information on 
Bernhard Fischer-Schweder, a thick file emerged and the weight of its implications shattered 
the postwar identity he had created. 
 On August 28, 1925, Bernhard Fischer-Schweder had joined the SA – the brute 
security force for the nascent Nazi party.34  Four years later, Fischer-Schweder became a 
member proper of the Nazi party with the party number of 17,141.  With such a low number, 
Fischer-Schweder was considered an “old fighter” (alter Kämpfer) in the party – an 
ideologically-motivated Nazi who had joined the party when it was little more than a 
                                                 
33
 For more information on the history of the BDC and an overview of its holdings, see Henry Friedlander and 
Sybil Milton, eds., Archives of the Holocaust: An International Collection of Selected Documents, v.11 (New 
York: Garland, 1989). 
 
34
 Berlin Document Center to Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Köln (26 October 1954), EL20/1 II, Bd.1, SL. 
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thuggish movement of racism and Versailles revisionism.  Before his service in the SA, 
Fischer-Schweder had been active in the Freikorps, extralegal quasi-armies that continued to 
fight in the east long after the armistice in World War I was declared.  Gaining the rank of 
Oberführer in the SA, he emerged relatively prominently within the organization during the 
Nazi rise to power in 1933.  According to Gestapo reports from 1934, Fischer-Schweder was 
taken into “protective custody” in a concentration camp following the Röhm purge, which 
effectively decapitated the leadership of the SA.35  After nearly three months, he was released 
because “proof of his participation in the Röhm revolt could not be found.”  This did not 
deter his enthusiasm for the state, however, and in 1941 he was promoted to Police Director 
in Memel, which carried with it SS membership.  He remained in the SS thereafter, though 
he was reassigned after 1941 and served in various Panzer divisions of the Waffen-SS until 
the injuries he sustained in the closing months of the war. 
 A series of documents in his file further highlighted the involvement of Fischer-
Schweder in the Nazi regime.  A 1942 letter from Fischer-Schweder to Reichsführer-SS and 
Head of the German Police, Heinrich Himmler, which thanked him for a birthday gift, stating 
that he “considered it a renewal of the bonds of duty and loyalty” to the state, certainly did 
not bode well for Fischer-Schweder’s future.36  Nor did an SS report from March 1943, 
which detailed his erratic behavior, excess drinking, and penchant for firing his sidearm 
indoors.  In defense of his domestic marksmanship, he argued at the time that he had been 
unaware of any regulations against the “misuse of firearms.”37  From the employment 
                                                 
35
 Geheimnis Staatspolizeiamt, Berlin, to the Oberste SA-Führung, München (4 October 1934), EL20/1 II, Bd.1, 
SL. 
 
36
 Bernhard Fischer-Schweder to Reichsführer-SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei (14 December 1942), EL20/1 
II, Bd.1, SL.   
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perspective of the civil service in 1954, the only thing worse than hiring a former SS officer 
was hiring a reckless, alcoholic SS officer with a poor understanding of both basic firearm 
safety and the law. 
 These findings further demonstrated that Fischer-Schweder’s postwar resume had 
been a carefully constructed set of half-truths.  He had not lied directly about his service: he 
had indeed risen through the ranks of the civil service from Breslau to the prominent post of 
Police Director in Memel.  The Center findings confirmed these aspects of his record.  But 
Fischer-Schweder had omitted any mention that this string of promotions was accompanied 
by a parallel ascent through the Nazi hierarchy.   
 By November 1954, the Berlin Document Center findings arrived to the regional 
government in charge of Fischer-Schweder’s employment.38  The situation called for 
immediate action, as Fischer-Schweder had clearly manipulated the system and played upon 
the trusting ignorance of the authorities through his application for the civil service.  On 
November 23, he was called in for a meeting with his employers.  He knew that he was had, 
and rather than deny all, Fischer-Schweder searched hard for a silver lining.  He pointed out 
that he too had suffered under the Nazi regime, having spent several months in a 
concentration camp in 1934.  “I also successfully rejected,” he claimed, “membership in the 
SS from about 1937 to 1941,” joining in 1941 only because his Memel promotion required 
it.39  As for the self-incriminating postwar lies and falsehoods of this past, he continued the 
one-time successful excuse of attempting to avoid immediate imprisonment in a Soviet camp.   
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 Two days later, the officials decided Fischer-Schweder could no longer serve as camp 
director.  Their decision noted that he had not only lied on his application about his birth date 
but that he had also “hidden his membership in the [Nazi] Party and SS” from the military 
tribunal in Bad Neustadt, rendering his “unaffected” denazification status all but invalid.40  
At the same time, putting a former SS officer in charge of a refugee camp reflected poorly on 
the local government to say the least, and a consensus seems to have emerged to keep the 
matter silent.  Any public revelations of the incident would be an embarrassment for the 
government.  They made the decision that Fischer-Schweder would have to resign. 
This desire to avoid a public reaction also seems to have been fueled by a sense of 
compassion for Fischer-Schweder.  As they noted, “Fischer is handicapped, he is married, 
and he has a child.  He would have to go to great lengths to create a new life.”41  They 
reflected positively on his service as the camp director, and though he had forced their hand 
through his falsehoods, they wished him no long-term ill.  To this end, they wrote him a letter 
of recommendation for future applications, which noted the “care and cultivation” he had 
shown to inhabitants of the camp.42  Similar to Pallmer’s faithful devotion to Fischer-
Schweder in the opening anecdote, the realization that he had been a member of the SS 
seemingly posed no inherent moral dilemmas for authorities.  They asked him to resign not 
because of concerns about his SS and Nazi past, but because he had lied on his application.  
 Fischer-Schweder, recognizing that he was no longer playing from a position of 
strength, found no choice but to acquiesce to the demand.  Whether he delayed the action or 
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further negotiated with the government is not certain, but his resignation did not arrive until 
early 1955.  On February 2, under the subject line, “Termination of my employment 
contract,” he wrote: 
I am requesting a release from the terms of my employment of January 1, 1954, in 
accordance with the required six-week notice of resignation, and in consideration of 
the fact that from the day of my employment I have not yet taken a vacation. 
 
As for the reason of my resignation, I want to note that an extremely opportune job in 
industry has been offered to me, which pays considerably more than my current 
position.  In the interest of my family I would like to take this offer.43 
 
He began his vacation several weeks later, and his last official day of employment was to be 
March 31, 1955.44  Regarding the supposed job offer he had received, Fischer-Schweder was 
bluffing.  Indeed, he seemed to be of the persuasion that he would only resign if he was able 
to find a job in the private sector.  Officials agreed to make some general efforts to aid his job 
search and accepted his resignation.45 
 Fischer-Schweder, however, was quickly discouraged.  A month after his resignation 
and a bout of frustrating rejections from prospective employers, he wrote to the regional 
government requesting to be reinstated.46  Though the regional government in North-
Württemberg had attempted to help him find a job in the private sector, these had come to 
naught and he had recently been rejected.  He had not heard back regarding his application 
for the civil service in neighboring South-Baden.  Without a new job, Fischer-Schweder 
demanded his old one back.  In addition to this economic plea, he made an appeal to their 
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sympathies, “Based simply on my upbringing, I joined a party at a very young age, not 
knowing what forms it would later take.”47  He went on to state that certain individuals 
would confirm his claims if they gave them the opportunity.  But from the perspective of the 
officials, the matter was closed, and employed elsewhere or not, Fischer-Schweder no longer 
had a place at the Ulm camp.  On April 13, 1955, he was officially fired from the camp.48 
 
A Trial of Patience 
 Though Bernhard Fischer-Schweder had learned to take shrapnel to the chest, he had 
not yet learned to take a hint, and on April 18, 1955, he sued the regional government for 
reinstatement.  His lawsuit had a threefold aim: 
1.) It will be shown that the resignation of the plaintiff from February 2, 1955 is null; 
2.) that the employment contract was not ended by summary firing of April 13, 1955; 
3.) [that] the accused state will be charged with bearing the costs of the lawsuit.49 
 
He argued along similar lines to his earlier defenses: he had, indeed, been a member of the 
Nazi party, but was not ideologically motivated, had himself suffered under the regime, and 
had always performed dutifully as a civil servant.  In his statement, he went on to say that he 
had “committed no political crime” and that his “political history as stated here was the full 
truth.”50  
 To help him make his case, Fischer-Schweder included a number of statements.  
Earlier in April, he began to call in these favors from individuals known in some capacity 
during the 1930s.  In general they spoke glowingly of Fischer-Schweder, both as an 
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individual and as an opponent of the Nazi regime.  One individual, a Dr. Nitschke in 
Schleswig, noted that Fischer-Schweder had been taken “very much against his will” into 
SS.51  Another remembered that Fischer-Schweder had “vouched” for him when first rejected 
for membership in the NSDAP, which ostensibly was intended to speak more to Fischer-
Schweder’s loyalty than to his involvement in the regime.52  One example demonstrates the 
anecdotal nature of these accounts: 
Both Mr. Fischer and I, who were in our homes and unaware of the impending 
actions, were alarmed at the events against the Jews in November 1938 
[Kristallnacht].  In the courtyard of the police station were a great number of arrested 
Jews, one of whom spoke to Mr. Fischer and explained that he had been an officer in 
World War I and was a holder of the Iron Cross, First Class.  This man left after an 
escape by dark.  As far as I can remember, he emigrated shortly thereafter to 
Prague.53  
 
Though the statement stopped short of stating that Fischer-Schweder played a role in the 
escape, it ably suggested a characteristic empathy.  Curiously, Fischer-Schweder even 
included in his defense the letter of reference he received from the regional government after 
his resignation.  
 Like much of 1955, the trial did not go well for Fischer-Schweder.  Legally, the court 
“rejected the suit as unfounded.”54  Against his first argument, that his resignation should be 
nullified, the court argued that he had hardly been coerced and so the resignation stood.  
From this, it followed that his firing was moot, stating, “It did not depend on whether the 
accused state still had the right…to terminate the employment on April 13, 1955.  At that 
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time the employment contract no longer existed.”55  If that was the injury, the insult came 
when the court saddled Fischer-Schweder with the two-thousand Deutschmark legal costs, 
not an insignificant sum for the unemployed plaintiff.  This ruling ended Fischer-Schweder’s 
career in the civil service, but the more serious development of the trial would not be settled 
in this courtroom. 
The peculiar contours of this labor trial did not go unnoticed by the public at large.  
Article 131 had been intended to allow a number of individuals to reenter the civil service; it 
had not made it a civil right for these individuals to be employed there.  This reversal of the 
situation, in which a former SS officer was suing the government for the right to command a 
refugee camp, found wide resonance.  Local press commented on the “interesting labor court 
trial” and the “reemergence” of the SS officer.56  The success of this coverage prompted a 
German news wire agency to request “to be informed of the next meeting date” for additional 
reporting.57  Though further articles were not forthcoming, Fischer-Schweder’s name had 
now appeared in the media identifying him as an SS officer in Memel during the war.  The 
effects would be costly. 
The idea that all press is good press does not apply to former SS officers anxious to 
avoid serious inquiries into their past.  Fischer-Schweder recognized the issues at play.  
Though his involvement in the SS had cost him his job, it had not yet cost him time in prison.  
Fearing further developments, Fischer-Schweder responded as he apparently considered best: 
he wrote a letter to the editor.  On May 26, 1955 – one day after an article about his lawsuit 
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appeared in the press – a brief seven-point statement appeared in the local newspaper, the 
Ulmer Nachrichten.  In addition to offering a general rehash of his lawsuit, Fischer-Schweder 
argued there that during the war “I kept many people—Christians, Jews, Germans, Austrians, 
and Poles—from harm and mortal danger.”  He again used Cold War tensions to explain his 
false postwar information, and as to the issue of why he continued to use false information in 
1953, he distilled the essence of his postwar integration tactics: “I had no reason to bring up 
things that I was not asked about.”58   
To be sure, no one could accuse Fischer-Schweder of undue forthrightness, but the 
questions posed to him quickly began to change in the weeks after these articles appeared.  
The rapid initiation and development of an investigation into Bernhard Fischer-Schweder can 
be credited largely to two accusations stemming from the peculiar decisions he made in 
1955.  These decisions – his application for the civil service in South-Baden after his 
resignation from the camp and the filing of a lawsuit against the North-Württemberg 
government – resulted in two devastating revelations about his character and past behavior.59  
The first, by Meta Poneleit, suggested for the first time a particular criminality to his 
behavior and not just membership in a Nazi organization.  The second, a statement by 
Wilhelm Kersten, pointed out a string of state-sponsored crimes hitherto unexplored in the 
West German understanding of the Third Reich.  The appearance of both statements in such a 
short span of time can only be attributed to the strange series of public overtures Fischer-
Schweder made in the previous months. 
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Given the centrality of these disastrous decisions, then, it is useful to consider how 
and why they made sense to Fischer-Schweder at the time.  His choice to disappear under the 
radar after the war conformed to denazification trends.  Similarly, his resurfacing in 1953 
aligned with the constitutional changes of Article 131.  But why, after losing one job for Nazi 
membership, would a man with so much to hide reapply (for a second time) to the 
government and file suit in court – essentially inviting greater scrutiny by the government 
and public alike?  While no definitive answer is possible, Fischer-Schweder probably came at 
these decisions from a different perspective.  He likely interpreted the Berlin Document 
Center revelations as having put an end to questions about his past, not inviting more.  To 
reiterate an earlier point, he did not recognize that by the 1950s the situation for Nazi 
reintegration had changed considerably and the cards were no longer stacked in his favor.  He 
did not realize that through these decisions, he would attract the attention of accusers, 
investigators and prosecutors. 
 
The Wrath of Spurned Subordinates 
 Word of Fischer-Schweder’s criminality first reached the Ulm prosecutors via an 
unexpected package that arrived to the district attorney’s office on June 13, 1955.60   Sent 
from the detectives of the regional capital of Stuttgart, the contents demanded immediate 
attention.  Dr. Rudolf Mettler, the chief prosecutor, opened and removed the documents, 
which concerned Fischer-Schweder.  Only a few weeks earlier, Mettler had become familiar 
with him through the labor court affair.  Perhaps Mettler expected the information to concern 
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this situation, but as he was soon to discover, the contents of this envelope were of an 
entirely different ilk.   
A cover letter noted that enclosed were statements regarding the wartime behavior of 
Fischer-Schweder as recalled by his former secretary in Memel, Meta Poneleit.  The 
statements had been prepared several months earlier, at the end of March 1955, by a Dr. 
Ballweg, who served in human resources for the regional government in South-Baden.  He 
had been making a routine inquiry pursuant to Fischer-Schweder’s recent application to join 
the civil service there.  Ballweg passed the information on to Stuttgart, which had now 
forwarded the matter to Mettler in Ulm, under whose jurisdiction the matter fell. 
Mettler set aside the cover letter and turned to Poneleit’s comments.  She described 
briefly her service from 1939-1944 in Memel, before the questions turned to Fischer-
Schweder.  As Ballweg reported it, she paused before responding, but stated simply: “He was 
Satan.”61  A harsher condemnation is scarcely imaginable.  Ballweg pressed for more details.  
She described Fischer-Schweder as an alcoholic who was uniformly disliked.  Asked whether 
she could think of any specific incidents or illustrative examples, Poneleit recalled the 
following story: 
According to someone in the police service, Fischer went to the Memel ghetto for his 
pleasure one Sunday.  There was a four-meter wide grave there that had been dug out 
for shootings.  He said to a Jew, if you can jump over this grave and make it 
successfully to the other side, I will let you live.  During the leap over the grave, he 
then shot him.62 
 
Within the week, Mettler opened a preliminary criminal investigation into Fischer-Schweder.   
 While the Poneleit revelations emerged out of Fischer-Schweder’s civil service 
application in South-Baden, the Kersten statements came out of his lawsuit against the 
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government in North-Württemberg.  The coverage of the case in the local newspapers caught 
the attention of a Mr. Böhnke, resident of Ulm.  The story of an SS officer from Memel in 
1941 reminded Böhnke of Wilhelm Kersten, an acquaintance who had also been in the 
Memel police at that time and who now lived in Hanover.  He wrote Kersten for information, 
enclosing a copy of Fischer-Schweder’s letter to the editor. 
On July 3, 1955, Kersten responded to Böhnke’s letter, happy to have heard from an 
old friend.63  He noted that he had indeed known Fischer-Schweder, and in fact had acted as 
his driver on several occasions.  Kersten told Böhnke that he had shared Fischer-Schweder’s 
letter to the editor with another former Memel policeman, and upon reading the claims, “He 
could only shake his head that he [Fischer-Schweder] had supposedly been a friend to Jews 
and Poles.”  Kersten also responded to the argument that Fischer-Schweder had been forcibly 
taken into the SS, stating, “Mr. Fischer had explained to me that he did everything he could 
in order to go from the SA to the SS.”  However, his most damning statement occurred at the 
end of the two-page letter, unprovoked by Böhnke and certainly not previously referred to by 
Fischer-Schweder: “Fischer-Schweder…led the first shooting of some 100 Jews in 
Garsden.”64  
Böhnke passed on the letter from Kersten to the Israelitische Kultusvereinigung 
(Israeli Cultural Association) offices in Stuttgart, which forwarded them on to Dr. Mettler in 
Ulm on September 12.  In a cover note, the representative of the organization, Mr. Warscher 
wrote, “We are hereby filing a criminal complaint against Mr. Fischer-Schweder.”65  The 
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intervention of this document and this organization gave added impulse to the investigation 
and placed greater pressure on the investigator’s shoulders to carry it out successfully. 
The Poneleit and Kersten documents represent a remarkable set of accusations.  To a 
large extent, Fischer-Schweder was responsible for the appearance of both.  As already seen, 
his application led to the first and his lawsuit to the second, but beyond this both accusations 
shared a deep-seated resentment of Fischer-Schweder.  To have a former secretary and a one-
time chauffeur volunteer such incriminating information speaks a great deal to Fischer-
Schweder’s wartime demeanor.  Though one can only surmise the personal interactions 
between Poneleit and Fischer-Schweder that led her to call him “Satan,” Kersten was more 
forthcoming about his personal contempt.  While on service in Memel, Kersten had 
unknowingly arrested Fischer-Schweder’s first wife for walking her dog without a leash, 
which ended predictably in a fourteen-day prison sentence for Kersten.66  In their 
accusations, both authors mobilized against Fischer-Schweder more out of contempt for his 
character than for his crimes. 
Regardless of the authors’ motivations, the two statements resolved fundamental 
problems for the investigators.  Police in Stuttgart had earlier made some general inquiries 
into Fischer-Schweder’s background, but they did not know whether anything improper had 
ever taken place, or if it had, when and where these crimes occurred.  Investigators first 
questioned Fischer-Schweder’s early support for Nazism and his role in the police force in 
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Breslau, turning up nothing criminal.67  Poneleit’s denunciation therefore reoriented the 
efforts, pointing to a specific crime in a specific place: Memel, 1941.   
Even with this new focus, the interviews carried out between the arrival of the 
Poneleit statement and that of Kersten, a three-month window between June and September 
1955, indicate that her information alone was insufficient.  Though they conducted five 
interviews with members of the Memel police force under Fischer-Schweder, there was no 
mention of mass shootings.  Similarly, none could confirm Poneleit’s claims about his 
shooting of Jews in a ghetto.  What did emerge was a negative view of Fischer-Schweder as 
an “exact, militaristic” individual, widely disliked “because of his somewhat arrogant 
egomaniacal personality and because he liked to try and disregard laws and regulations.”68  
These statements portrayed Fischer-Schweder as a belligerent leader whose actions often 
circumvented or exceeded norms; if crimes had occurred in or near Memel, they were the 
actions of sadistic individuals.   
Kersten’s denunciation thus came as a revelation, providing information on the time 
and place of a mass execution in Memel.  Poneleit’s story of Fischer-Schweder as sadist, 
wantonly murdering for pleasure, proved a hard case to make, but if there had been a mass 
execution, as Kersten indicated, then others were involved and the net could be drawn more 
closely around Fischer-Schweder.  Though the scope of the crimes under investigation 
increased, the emphasis on Fischer-Schweder the lone madman diminished, as a mass 
execution required cooperation and coordination among a range of individuals and groups.  
Armed with this new information, the investigators began to expand the investigation.   
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 The Poneleit and Kersten accusations had an impact not only on the investigation, but 
on the investigators.  These Ulm detectives had no specific training in investigating war 
crimes or navigating the murky waters of state-sponsored mass murder.  They were not 
operating in a framework to expect or to handle crimes of this nature.  As a result, although 
Fischer-Schweder placed himself in the SS at the border region of Lithuania on the eve of 
war with the Soviet Union, what today might be considered the frontlines of the Holocaust, 
this admission had no criminal connotations for investigators in 1955; the difference in 
potential crimes committed in 1941 Memel and 1936 Breslau was not apparent.  In fact, the 
dominant trend in the hundreds of postwar trials and investigations leading up to the Ulm 
trial had been to try Germans for crimes committed in Germany against other Germans, not 
for crimes against Jews in the war lands to the east.69  This created a bureaucratic and 
investigative impulse to look first for crimes against fellow Germans, a tendency that the 
Poneleit and Kersten accusations overcame.  These revelations taught the Ulm investigators 
to ask new questions of the past. 
 
“In the Name of the Führer” 
The investigators immediately encountered the challenges inherent in gathering 
reliable evidence on state-sponsored crimes that occurred over a decade earlier.  They took 
                                                 
69
 Of the over 450 trials that took place in West Germany for war crimes between the end of the war and the 
Ulm trial in 1958, over 75% concerned crimes in Germany proper and nearly 65% with Germans as the 
primary target group of these crimes.  To some extent, this disproportion is due to initial Allied restrictions 
on German jurisdiction over war crimes, limiting them to crimes in Germany.  As a result, Endphase crimes 
committed in the closing days of the war during the retreat across the Reich were tried disproportionately in 
the early years.  For a more detailed discussion of the legal restrictions on prosecutions and other 
particularities in the legal system of postwar West Germany, see Henry Friedlander, “Deportations”, Leo 
Baeck Institute Year Book 29; and Marc von Miquel, Ahnden oder Amnestieren? Westdeutsche Justiz und 
Vergangenheitspolitik in den Sechzigerjahren (Göttingern: Wallstein Verlag, 2004).  Figures and analysis 
drawn from the trial summaries in NS Justiz und NS-Verbrechen: die westdeutschen Strafurteile wegen 
nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 1998); synopses of the 
trials available on the website: “Justiz und NS-Verbrechen,” accessed 16 March 2008 
<http://www1.jur.uva.nl/junsv/>. 
 28 
the Kersten statement and went back to those previously interviewed and pressed for fresh 
information.  The formula over the coming months would be to use new information to ply 
details from old witnesses.  Each witness was pressured at the end of the interrogation to 
provide any and all names of those whom they remembered as potentially involved.  It was a 
slow, tedious process, but one which allowed them partially to overcome the difficulties of 
investigating a crime that occurred in a foreign country.   
Those interviewed by and large played a difficult balancing game, trying to come 
across as helpful and open, while reluctant to provide any self-incriminating statements.  
When confronted with the information about the massacre in Garsden, most acknowledged 
that this occurred, but made self-exculpatory statements along the lines of “I did not see these 
things with my own eyes.”70  Similarly, they tended to speak of the shooting in what 
Christopher Browning has termed the “anonymous passive,” noting the crimes but omitting 
the criminals: “After the first group had been shot, the next ten people were led to the 
grave… In the end, they themselves were shot just as their predecessors.”71  Another trope 
was to claim that Garsden had been a “center of resistance” against the Wehrmacht troops 
and that those killed had not been Jews but rather “saboteurs, spies, and other similar 
elements.”72  Parsing out the particulars of a shooting that had taken place fourteen years 
earlier in places and circumstances wholly foreign to the investigators posed substantial 
challenges from the outset. 
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Despite these difficulties, a number of details quickly emerged.  At the outset, 
investigators sought details on the shooting in Garsden.  This town, located not ten miles 
across the German-Lithuanian border from Memel, had been among the first invaded during 
the outbreak of the war against the Soviet Union in June 1941.  On June 24, only two days 
after the invasion, a number of civilians were rounded up, forced to dig a mass grave, and led 
out in groups to be shot.  All those interviewed agreed that these orders had initiated from 
above, and most argued that the killings were carried out in response to partisan activity 
against German soldiers.  Beyond these general details, however, great disagreement 
emerged regarding the number of those killed and whether or not the victims had been 
Jewish.   
Given the reluctance of most to volunteer information, the statement of Werner 
Schmidt-Hammer on November 9 added clarity to the investigation.  The optometrist from 
Aalen and former member of the police in Memel revealed much through his self-
incriminating remarks.  He confirmed what many had already alluded to, namely that 
Garsden was no exception; there had been a number of other shooting sites on the border 
lands near Memel.  Though he claimed that only partisans were killed, not Jews, Schmidt-
Hammer stated: 
The creation of an execution squad [Exekutionskommando], which consisted of 
members of the police [Schutzpolizei] from the police office in Memel, was ordered 
by Fischer-Schweder.  The squad consisted of 10-12 police officers.  These officers 
were chosen by Major Günther [of the Memel Schutzpolizei], and I was appointed as 
leader of this squad by Major Günther.73  
 
He went on to describe his role as leader of this execution squad in Garsden, saying that 
Fischer-Schweder had told him to read out the purpose for the executions before each group 
was killed.  Under the guise of partisan resistance, Schmidt-Hammer read aloud before each 
                                                 
73
 Statement by Werner Schmidt-Hammer (9 November 1955), EL322 II, Bd.1, SL. 
 30 
group was killed, “You are being shot in the name of the Führer on account of attacks 
against German troops.”74  In this way, victims died as though enemies of the Reich.   
 With the Schmidt-Hammer statements, the case began to take shape.  Subsequent 
interviews filled in details and by mid-December the investigators had amassed information 
on four distinct shootings between June and August 1941 in Lithuanian towns near Memel, 
involving estimates of between eight and three hundred victims per execution.75  Witnesses 
noted that though Schmidt-Hammer had given the orders to fire during these massacres, “the 
shooting had been ordered by higher-up SS and police officers.”76  A number of statements 
also directly refuted claims that those killed had been resisters.  Kurt Neubacher, who 
admitted to being a shooter, described the process and victims: “The members of the 
shooting squad, I among them, had the order to aim our guns, always two to a Jew, at the 
heart…The Jews all fell in and near the grave.”77  Another stated, “I personally knew a 
number of the Jews who were shot.”78  A striking story retold by another shooter involved a 
Jewish victim, who upon recognizing his shooter as a neighbor, stated, “Gustav, shoot 
well!”79 
 Statements such as these revealed a great deal about the nature and scale of the 
crimes, but they did not solve the most vexing issue for the investigators: “Whether Fischer-
Schweder carried out the shootings of Jews based on orders from a higher office or from his 
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own initiative.”80  To this extent, it is worth bearing in mind that the investigators at this 
point were not investigating crimes so much as they were investigating a single criminal, 
Fischer-Schweder, and it was in consideration of his prospective guilt that interviews and 
interrogations were made.  The question of his responsibility was therefore absolutely central 
to the prosecutor’s ability to try Fischer-Schweder for murder.   
In the postwar period, the Federal Republic of Germany tried crimes committed in the 
Third Reich under the same code of law as applied to all crimes in West Germany.  As a 
result, the strict West German definition of “murder” applied to war crimes as well, which 
consisted of several requirements.  First, to convict an individual of first degree murder, the 
court had to prove that the homicide was committed out of personal initiative and due to base 
motive, cruelty, or other distinguishing criteria.  Second, for a crime to classify as murder, it 
had to be proven that “blood lust” was a motivation in the crime.81  Claiming to have “only 
followed orders” could therefore disqualify the charge of murder in both cases.  In such an 
instance, the person could only be accused of accessory to murder, meaning one who carries 
out a crime that was not willed or identified as one’s one.   
To establish guilt under this strict rubric, the investigators had two options: prove that 
Fischer-Schweder had personally authorized the creation of a shooting squad to carry out the 
murder of innocent civilians, or prove that he had demonstrated a “thirst for blood” in other 
ways during these massacres.  Based on the interviews conducted, both options seemed open.  
                                                 
 
80
 Report by Helmut Opferkuch (1 March 1956), EL322, Bd.1, SL. 
 
81
 Adalbert Rückerl, The Investigation of Nazi Crimes, trans. by Derek Rutter (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 
1980), 41-43.  This strange distinction was not resolved until 1962, when the “Stashinski judgment” of the 
German Federal Supreme Court stated that the Befehlnotstand no longer held resonance and an individual 
could and would be held accountable for his/her actions.  
 32 
The statement of Schmidt-Hammer, which remained invaluable due to its self-incriminating 
content, had clearly pointed to Fischer-Schweder as the progenitor of the orders.   
A string of accusations about his extreme behavior also seemed to satisfy the “thirst 
for blood” requirement.  Certainly, Poneleit’s condemnations remained in consideration, 
though these had not been subsequently verified.  More recently, Kersten had suggested that 
Fischer-Schweder “went alone into the grave [in Garsden] and – immediately next to those 
still living – delivered the finishing shots.”82  Neubacher, one of the other shooters, recalled 
an incident during the selections in Garsden, when Jewish men were separated from the 
women and children.  A boy, out of fear of separation, ran to his father.  Fischer-Schweder 
then “exchanged one of the men who was supposed to be shot with the Jew’s son.  Father and 
son were then shot at the same time, standing next to one another.”83 
 By the spring of 1956, the investigators were therefore sufficiently convinced of 
Fischer-Schweder’s guilt in authorizing and carrying out the massacres of “at least 400” 
individuals in the Lithuanian towns of Garsden and Krottingen, with others still under 
investigation.84  On May 2, 1956, they interrogated Fischer-Schweder, presenting him with 
the full array of statements against him.  Though unable to deny that those killed were 
Jewish, Fischer-Schweder stated that Garsden “was only inhabited by Jews”; in other words, 
they were “targeted not as Jews, but as snipers and murderers of German soldiers.”85  As for 
the creation of a shooting squad, Fischer-Schweder argued that this did not originate with 
him: 
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[Hans-Joachim] Böhme, the leader of the state police service in Tilsit called me after 
a consultation with Berlin, possibly via telegram, and told me he had clarified his 
jurisdiction.  He has received orders to take over the assignment of the troops because 
it rightly concerned the armed resistance of civilians.  But he had no people for 
organizing a shooting squad because the majority of his officers went along with the 
Einsatzkommandos in the invasion.86 
 
According to Fischer-Schweder, he had no choice but to make his men available to Böhme.  
The Fischer-Schweder defense rested upon this refocusing of responsibility for orders onto 
those higher up the chain of command and the claim that he operated under a compulsion to 
follow orders and that the victims were shot as resisters, not Jews.  He also summarily 
dismissed the devastating claims of Kersten, Poneleit, and Neubacher.   His defenses rang 
hollow and the next day, May 3, 1956, authorities arrested Bernhard Fischer-Schweder. 
 
Nazi Crimes Come Home 
 What to make of Bernhard Fischer-Schweder?  He was in many ways an archetypal 
character in the larger story of twentieth-century Germany.  As an anti-democratic Freikorps 
member after WWI, he was too young to win the war but determined to win the peace.  He 
became an old fighter in the Nazi party, drawn more by its ideological zeal and anti-Semitism 
than its economic promise.  Under the Third Reich, Fischer-Schweder embodied the SS 
opportunist, offering soldiers and self for participation in mass murder.  The belligerent and 
alcoholic Holocaust perpetrator, however, found himself demoted and thrust onto the 
advancing Soviet war machine at war’s close.  During denazification, the wounded Nazi 
officer went under the radar, disappearing into society until confidence caused him to 
resurface.  As an Article 131er, he reentered the civil service, only to be taken down by a 
society increasingly sensitive to the problems of reintegrating unpunished Nazi perpetrators.  
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He was, in other words, present at and participant in a vast sequence of deplorable aspects of 
German society.  None of these experiences were unique, but to have them combined in the 
life of one individual affords a singular opportunity to approach thirty years of German 
history through a single biography.   
 And yet for all of his efforts to change his name and date of birth, to avoid, hide, and 
conceal his murderous past, what brought Fischer-Schweder down was something he had 
never bothered to hide, something he had in fact always celebrated: his role as Police 
Director in Memel in 1941.  He had felt confident that the details of his past in and near 
Memel would remain undiscovered, and for a decade he was correct.  He listed this position 
on his denazification forms, used it to gain reentry into the civil service, and even noted it in 
his seven-point letter to the editor.  In the end, this knowledge alone proved sufficient to 
undo Fischer-Schweder.  The revelations about his criminal past came not from SS members 
or Nazi documents, but from his former secretary and chauffeur.  The information was 
always there. 
It is therefore fundamentally significant that for a full decade after the war, no one 
bothered to question this background.  He commanded the police force in a city on the 
periphery of the Holocaust, where not ten miles away hundreds of Jews were summarily shot 
and killed.  It would not take a crack investigator to wonder if the one might have knowledge 
of the other; all it would take would be the knowledge that the two had happened.  This 
knowledge did not exist in West Germany until brought, by Poneleit and Kersten, to the 
attention of authorities.  The majority of crimes committed in the East had remained there 
since the war ended.  With the investigation of Fischer-Schweder, the Nazi crimes began to 
come home.
  
Chapter 2 
The Trial of Ten 
Over a year after Fischer-Schweder’s arrest, on July 6, 1957, regional newspapers in 
West Germany were abuzz with information about a “ghastly trial” coming before the 
courtroom in Ulm.87  The Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung wrote about this new case’s strong 
“parallels to the Nuremberg trials,” suggesting that it “would possibly grab the attention of 
the entire world.”88  The investigative efforts alone, they noted, had consumed countless 
hours and thousands of pages of paperwork.  The cause of their outbursts was a press 
conference held the previous morning in the district attorney’s office in Ulm. 
 On that day, the lead prosecutors of the ongoing investigation against Bernhard 
Fischer-Schweder read the charges against those arrested.  In all, ten men were to be tried for 
crimes of murder and accessory to murder during their time on the Lithuanian border regions 
in 1941.  Appreciating the magnitude of the moment, the prosecutors sent notice of the 
conference to all the major publications of the area.89  For them, this was the culmination of 
extensive investigations stretching back over a year.  The path to the podium on that day was 
difficult and drawn-out, and along the way the investigative team broke with legal tradition 
and in the process laid the groundwork for a new way of prosecuting Nazi war criminals.  
 When the investigation began the previous year, there was little indication of its 
future exceptionality.  Fischer-Schweder had certainly charted his own course through the 
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postwar period, but the contours of the investigation into his past were typical of those years.  
As with Fischer-Schweder’s situation, these prosecutions of Nazi war criminals frequently 
began with an accusation against an individual for war crimes.  Such accusations themselves 
were rare, as they required a chance encounter between a Nazi perpetrator and a survivor of 
their crimes, which by their very nature left few survivors.  This accusation would mobilize 
local investigators and district attorneys into action.  Depending on the stridency of these 
efforts, this individual would then be investigated and put on trial.  The outcome of these 
trials in turn hinged largely on the prosecutorial zeal of the district attorney and the juridical 
acumen of the presiding judge.   
What set the investigation of Fischer-Schweder apart from this bulk of hundreds of 
postwar cases was what took place between his arrest and the presentation of the indictments 
before the German public that July morning in 1957.  If the first part of this paper – Fischer-
Schweder’s postwar rise, fall, and arrest – held a mirror to West German society, 
illuminating dominant trends and subversive strands of postwar integration, what came next 
broke with these traditions and pointed West Germany down a new path of criminal 
prosecution and judicial engagement with its Nazi past.  The legal and institutional legacy of 
the trial that began with Fischer-Schweder was profound.  
The cultural legacy of the Ulm trial, though, was more ambiguous.  The crimes and 
criminals in question were of a different nature than previously brought before West German 
courts, and in this regard, the trial in principle had the potential to modify dominant 
narratives of the Nazi era.  But because of strictures in the 1950s West German legal system, 
the trial in effect reinforced these narratives.  In this way, the Ulm trial was interpreted at the 
time as a large and prominent case, but one that fit into the prosecutorial trends of the time, 
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namely that those on trial were sadistic murderers and therefore largely different from the 
bulk of the population.  This second half of the paper therefore seeks to explore this tension 
between the significant legal legacy of this trial and its more ambiguous cultural impact.   
 
The Stuttgart Directive 
With the arrest of Fischer-Schweder, the detectives initially began to close out the 
investigation and hand it over to the prosecutor for trial.  Due to the particularly self-
incriminating remarks made by Werner Schmidt-Hammer, he was to remain under 
investigation but was not arrested at the time.  The principal aim of the investigators had 
been to determine whether Fischer-Schweder had taken part in anything criminal, and if he 
had, to uncover sufficient evidence for his prosecution.  They were engaged in a process, 
widespread throughout postwar Germany, which emphasized the criminals; the crimes were 
secondary.  Certainly other individuals were involved in the mass murders in Garsden and 
other Lithuanian towns, but these were not the individuals under investigation in Ulm.   
 A letter from the regional prosecutor’s office decided otherwise.  The lead prosecutor 
of Stuttgart, Erich Nellmann, who oversaw ongoing investigations in the region, had been 
notified that the investigation was being concluded.  In June 1956, just a month after Fischer-
Schweder’s arrest, he wrote a memo to the regional government, Ulm investigators, and 
prosecutors.  It read:  
I have come to believe that…further extensive investigations are needed, which will 
necessarily require the full efforts of the head of the Ulm prosecutor’s office, Dr. 
Mettler.  The defendant Fischer-Schweder was extensively questioned recently about 
the charges against him, namely that he shot or allowed to have shot a great number 
of Jews in the border region of Memel-Lithuania at the beginning of war.  His defense 
has shown that the investigations so far were insufficient and they simply will have to 
be started over from scratch.90 
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Nellmann went on to cite public pressure for a more extensive investigation, noting that 
agencies such as the Israelitische Kultusvereinigung, which had earlier brought Kersten’s 
letter to the Ulm detectives, would not be satisfied with a narrow trial focused only on 
Fischer-Schweder. 
 The directive forced the investigation to reopen and pushed it in a wholly different 
direction.  First, it shifted the emphasis off the criminal and onto the crime.  The 
investigation was no longer into Fischer-Schweder and involving mass shootings in 
Lithuania, but rather into mass shootings in Lithuania and involving Fischer-Schweder.  This 
necessitated a second change, this time in personnel.  Since an investigative reorientation 
would require significantly more man hours and effort, Nellmann augmented the new 
demands by sending one of his top prosecutors, Erwin Schüle, to Ulm.  These two actions 
fundamentally altered the trajectory of the investigation into Fischer-Schweder.   
 Schüle set to work immediately upon receiving his assignment.  A forty-five year old 
Wehrmacht veteran of the Eastern Front, Schüle had been practicing law after the war at the 
public prosecutor’s office in Ludwigsburg near Stuttgart.91  As his first action in the Fischer-
Schweder case, he sent a German-language edition of Gerald Reitlinger’s The Final Solution 
to the investigators’ office in Ulm.92  This 1953 work was among the first to attempt a 
systematic approach the Nazi policies of extermination taken against European Jews.  As a 
first act, the move was symbolically significant.  The book made clear what Nellmann had 
intimated: these crimes could not be pursued in isolation, but rather only in the context of the 
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Nazi genocide of the Jews.  These were crimes committed as part of a state-sponsored plan of 
mass murder and had to be investigated and prosecuted as such.   
 The Reitlinger work further demonstrated Schüle’s willingness to move the 
investigation beyond the strict confines of perpetrator accounts to develop a rich backdrop to 
the mass murders.  From the moment he joined the case, the investigation grew in both 
breadth and depth; that is to say, the number of those investigated increased beyond Fischer-
Schweder, and the investigation sought to contextualize the shootings in the wider activities 
the Third Reich.  With these objectives in mind, Schüle reached out to non-traditional 
investigative sources, working with survivor organizations, academics, and governmental 
agencies to add texture to his case.   
 Schüle’s appointment thus led to a bifurcated investigation.  Along one track, the Ulm 
detectives continued to carry out the bulk of the interrogations, continuing the formula used 
with Fischer-Schweder: try to get those interviewed to offer new names and information, 
then use new information on old witnesses.  Once Fischer-Schweder fell and rolled on 
Böhme and others, the case began to come together.  Along the other, Schüle and Mettler 
worked on the historical background of the shootings, seeking military information, going 
through newly accessible archives, and collecting as much information as they could on 
conditions, contexts, and crimes of the Holocaust in Lithuania during 1941.  This was the 
investigation’s new path. 
 Unfortunately, in the middle of the 1950s, this was also the path less traveled.  
Tellingly, the best source on the Holocaust that existed for a West German prosecutor in 
1956 was a translated work by Reitlinger, an amateur historian in England.  Though 
generally recognized that the Nazi crimes against the Jews were of a singular nature, little 
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scholarly work had been done to articulate the mechanisms of this genocide.93  It has already 
been shown that without the Poneleit and Kersten statements the investigators had no idea 
that Fischer-Schweder, as an SS officer on the borders of the Soviet Union in 1941, might 
have been involved in crimes of the Holocaust.  Even once these crimes were uncovered, 
there was still confusion about the motivation behind the shootings and how or if they fit into 
any wider strategy during the opening months of war with Russia.  As a result, the new 
course of the investigation posed immediate challenges; the investigators would be parsing 
through new and previously inaccessible records and archives, poring over records untouched 
since Nuremberg.  
 
A Solitary Life 
 While the investigation of Fischer-Schweder expanded, the man himself sat alone in 
his cell in Ulm, unaware of the maelstrom he had called into being.  After fifty-one years, 
Fischer-Schweder’s life bore a strange ledger.  He had lived under five governments – 
Imperial, Weimar, Nazi, Occupied, and Federal Germany – and had the ill-earned distinction 
of finding himself incarcerated by the most recent three.  At the same time, he had 
successfully climbed the ranks of the civil service to achieve some local renown twice, in 
Memel and in Ulm.  For a man who spent most of his life working for the government, he 
often found himself at legal odds with it.   
 Isolated in his cell, Fischer-Schweder was allowed visits and saw his wife and son 
with some regularity, though correspondence between them was closely monitored.  A few 
weeks after his arrest, he wrote a lengthy missive to his “dear poor little wife” that blended 
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elements of self-defense, frustration, and sentimentality.94  He insisted on his innocence and 
told Irmgard that these misfortunes befalling him were “a final test that God meant for us.”  
The persistence of these self-serving remarks suggested that Fischer-Schweder was writing 
as much for the censors as for his wife.  More pragmatically, the letter addressed 
symptomatic problems of his imprisonment, requesting Irmgard to recharge his prison 
account so he could buy more Nes-Café and to buy him “one pair of long underwear because 
it’s ice-cold in the prison-issue pajamas.”   
He also tried to treat this problem at its source and hired the Ulm-based law firm of 
Schmid, Weller, and Wild to appeal for his release.  They worked on these appeals and 
sought to have the charges against him dropped.  While they did not deny that Fischer-
Schweder had participated in the shootings, they argued that he had been forced to do so and 
that he “would have risked his life and possibly even lost it” if he had refused to carry out 
these orders.95  The appeal then referred to statements from Fischer-Schweder and others 
which suggested that “Böhme and not the defendant was responsible for the operations in 
Garsden and Krottingen.”  A few days later they attempted to correct their statement, arguing 
that it was not Böhme but a Dr. Frohwann who was responsible.96   
 This argument amounted to a claim of Befehlnotstand, or a defense that Fischer-
Schweder was forced to follow orders.  This had become the standard postwar defense for 
Nazi criminality.  The main assertion was that the defendant carried out crimes based on 
orders from superiors.  Furthermore, the argument hinged on a counterfactual claim that to 
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not follow orders would have meant incurring grave punishment.  This defense forced 
prosecutors into the difficult position of having to disprove both assertions.  As prosecutor 
Mettler noted in the days following the arrest, “It especially comes down to what would have 
happened to the accused [Fischer-Schweder] and Schmidt-Hammer, if they had not followed 
orders.”97  The claim of Befehlnotstand also played off the sympathies and anxieties of the 
German public.  The nation had an uneven relationship with the Nazi past and the idea of 
acting under compulsion and out of threat to self played well to postwar notions that even 
perpetrators had been victims of the Nazi dictatorship.  Rounding up German men and 
putting them in prison for crimes they were allegedly forced to commit under threat of death 
did not sit well with many West Germans. 
 The idea of releasing a man accused of the murder of several hundred did not sit well 
with the court, however, and the appeal was denied.  The decision noted that Fischer-
Schweder “was suspected of at least taking part in the shootings,” and therefore he posed a 
significant flight risk.98  The “main danger,” the ruling went on to argue, was that he would 
“hinder the investigation of the truth by influencing witnesses or the other responsible 
parties.”  The decision set off a back-and-forth between Fischer-Schweder’s attorneys and 
the courtroom which resulted in dozens of appeals for his release over the years and months 
up through his trial.  Their constant rejections caused him to chafe.  He vented to his wife in 
November, “Sometimes I imagine that if I were sitting in a Soviet prison, I would have no 
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cause for surprise.  But we are supposedly in the lawful part of Germany.”99  He remained 
isolated in his cell for months carrying into years.  He was never released. 
 
Widening the Net 
 Though the court did not accept Fischer-Schweder’s appeals to be released, the 
investigators did follow up on the names of other responsible parties that he offered, 
specifically Böhme and Dr. Frohwann.  The search for these two individuals were the first 
efforts the investigators made following Nellmann’s memo to expand the trial.  The search 
also illustrated some of the challenges that investigators faced in the months between 
Fischer-Schweder’s arrest and the indictments against all the defendants.  Neither Böhme’s 
nor Frohwann’s name had been mentioned by any witnesses previous to the Fischer-
Schweder interrogations, so they set about re-interrogating previous witnesses.  Those 
interviewed offered very little, suggesting that Böhme may have been Stapo Tilsit leader and 
that he may have “died in the last days of the war.”100  On Frohwann, they offered nothing.   
With Böhme and Frohwann, the investigators encountered a new problem.  To this 
point in the investigation, they had been able to obtain addresses and personal information 
from those already interrogated, but with Böhme and Frohwann, no one claimed to know 
much about their past behavior, let alone their present whereabouts.  Even Böhme’s first 
name remained a mystery to the investigators.101  Here they came face-to-face with the 
ongoing issues of postwar integration and demographic shifts – the very same issues that 
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Fischer-Schweder had been able to exploit to his advantage.  Böhme and Frohwann may well 
have gone under the radar after the war, as Fischer-Schweder had, they may have died during 
the war, or they may have fled the country.  As one of the investigators stated in July 
regarding Böhme, “Whether he is alive or residing in the Federal Republic is simply 
unknown.”102  In the social frontiers of postwar West Germany, there were more ways for 
Nazis to hide than for the investigators to find them.   
Despite these difficulties, the investigators persisted and, in the end, succeeded.  
Frohwann proved easier to locate, for he had not left a Salzburg cemetery for the past ten 
years, having committed suicide by hanging at war’s end.103  Had he still been alive, the one-
time leader of the Memel border police and SS officer no doubt would have found himself 
among the defendants in Ulm.104  He, as others had and others would in the course of the 
trial, preferred death to postwar accountability.  His was but the gravest response to avoiding 
justice.  Böhme chose to hide in plain sight, but, as Fischer-Schweder had demonstrated, this 
did not necessarily make one easy to locate. 
The investigators knew that they were pursuing in Böhme an individual involved in 
the SS who operated out of the town of Tilsit during the war, which was located not far from 
Memel.  During their search, investigators had turned up more information on his war time 
activities, seemingly confirming Fischer-Schweder’s portrait of Böhme as the one who 
authorized these murders.  Schüle contacted numerous municipal governments searching for 
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any residents who fit Böhme’s general description.  When these turned up no results, he tried 
various veterans’ organizations to see if he was registered or even still alive.   
On August 20, 1956, their efforts were rewarded.  A telegraph arrived to the 
investigators that noted “a Hans Böhme, b. 1.10.1909 in Magdeburg” was currently living in 
a suburb of the West German city of Karlsruhe.105  This information matched the profile that 
investigators had put together.  If this really was Hans-Joachim Böhme, the investigators had 
just located the man most responsible for the shootings of Garsden and elsewhere.  On 
August 22, the prosecutors requested and received a warrant for his arrest.106 
The next day in the middle of the afternoon, the police went to the bank in Karlsruhe 
where Böhme worked.  The forty-six-year old came down to meet the detectives in a side-
office near the main lobby.  They asked Böhme where he was in 1941, to which he 
responded, “Tilsit.”  After “some further questions,” the detectives were convinced “without 
a doubt” that this was their Böhme, and informed him that they had a warrant for his arrest.  
Böhme did not react adversely, but asked that he be allowed to gather some items from his 
desk and notify his superiors.  Out of courtesy, they obliged.   
Böhme, accompanied by two detectives, returned to his fifth-floor office, where he 
gathered his items and wrote a note to his director, which he then slid under the door.  Böhme 
paused on the way back to the lobby and suggested that he needed to add something else to 
the letter.  As he entered the office, Böhme “suddenly shut the door behind him and turned 
around towards the window, opened it, and had the suicidal intention to throw himself from 
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it.”107  Thanks to the “quick reaction” of one of the detectives, Böhme was prevented from 
offing himself and was taken into custody. 
 After a second abortive attempt at suicide (this time jumping head first from the table 
of his cell), Böhme began to talk to the authorities.  Strapped to a hospital bed, he had little 
choice otherwise.108  He added details and new names to the investigation.109  His arrest was 
the first since Nellmann decided to expand the case and Schüle joined the team.  A major 
Nazi perpetrator, Böhme became a chief defendant, the highest-ranking authority put on trial 
for the shootings along the Memel border lands.  If Fischer-Schweder was the defendant who 
clumsily sprang the trap, Böhme would be its biggest catch.   
 Böhme’s arrest came still relatively early in the investigation.  Of the ten men who 
would eventually find themselves indicted in June 1957, half of their names were not yet 
even known to the investigators.  Böhme’s arrest added impetus to the investigations.  While 
detectives crisscrossed Germany conducting interviews and interrogations, the prosecutors 
Mettler and Schüle worked on developing the case in greater depth.  Mettler spent time in the 
recently opened Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Institute for Contemporary History) in Munich, 
which housed a wealth of information on the Third Reich period and was one of West 
Germany’s first professional centers for academic research devoted to this aspect of its 
history.110  For his part, Schüle pored over the records in the Berlin Document Center.  He 
also finessed relationships with various organizations, such as the new Israeli memorial 
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group Yad Vashem, various United States military archivists, and German veterans’ 
organizations, in the process finding new perpetrators and even a number of Jewish survivors 
from Lithuania.   
 While these efforts led to many new arrests, the investigation did not always go as 
hoped.  One witness, Paul Gerber – who had made claims about the “terrible” nature of 
civilian resistance to Germans in Garsden but denied being a part of the murders – committed 
suicide only a week after his interrogation.111  In his suicide note, he bore the markings of 
instability, complaining incessantly about his “nerves.”  He wrote that since the interrogation, 
“I can’t find any rest.”  He found it unacceptable that he “should be a witness in a mass 
murder trial,” worrying that “no one will believe me…that I had nothing to do with these 
things.”112  Though unclear whether Gerber would have been formally charged and arrested 
for crimes in Lithuania, he found that possibility too great a risk to bear. 
 The prosecutors also ran into legal debates.  One of the would-be defendants, a man 
named Wolfgang Ilges from Cologne, found himself in the middle of a jurisdictional battle 
that the Ulm prosecutors would ultimately lose.  Ilges had been an SS officer under Böhme 
and participated in at least one shooting.  However, the courts decided that Ilges’ 
“relationship with Fischer-Schweder and the others could not be proven,” and so his case was 
handed over to the Cologne district attorney’s office.113  A number of the other defendants in 
the Ulm investigation were transported during the course of the Ilges trial in Cologne to 
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testify.114  He was sentenced later in 1957 to four years imprisonment as an accessory in the 
murder of over one hundred Jews in Augustowo, a Lithuanian shooting site.115 
 These difficulties aside, the investigation moved towards completion.  By the spring 
of 1957, the case against the participants of the mass executions along the border strip in 
Lithuania sixteen years earlier was nearly complete.  Though they had run across dozens of 
individuals who no doubt bore some war crime guilt, the prosecutors decided to limit the case 
in question to ten defendants.116  Mettler and Schüle were working on the massive 
indictments against these ten, when a combination of exhaustion, stress, and pressure caused 
Mettler to buckle.  Citing a “neuro-vegetative disorder,” Mettler stepped down from the 
investigation on April 27.117  By the end of July, Schüle completed the indictments alone and 
the case was ready for trial.  
 
The Crimes, the Criminals 
 And so it was that on the morning of July 5, 1957, the prosecutors found themselves 
before a packed room of journalists, showcasing the fruits of the investigation.  At ten 
o’clock in the morning in the offices of the Ulm district attorney, Nellmann and Schüle 
announced the Ulm case to the world.118  Beyond informing the public, the indictments were 
also the first time that Fischer-Schweder learned the full scope of the proceedings he had 
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blustered into existence.  Prepared over the previous months principally by Schüle, the 212-
page indictment document read more like a formal work of history than a legal document.119  
It synthesized the interviews, documents, and other pieces of evidence gathered over the 
previous years into a reconstruction of the Nazi regime, mechanisms of the Holocaust, and 
various mass shootings along a narrow border-strip of land in Lithuania during a few summer 
months in 1941. 
 The indictments began large, with the macro-level decision-making processes that 
defined the Nazi regime in general and the invasion of the Soviet Union in particular.  The 
focus increasingly narrowed in on the northern reaches of this war.  From the Baltic States it 
zoomed closer onto Lithuania and onto its Western border, abutting Memel and Eastern 
Prussia.  Eventually, the prosecutors settled on a region just twenty-five kilometers across, a 
region along which the ten defendants of the trial had personally carried out the executions of 
at least 5,186 Jewish men, women, and children from late June to August 1941.120 
 These murders, the indictment went on, were the work of Einsatzkommando Tilsit, a 
unit to which all the defendants had at some point belonged.  This terminology was not 
foreign to the German public.  Though the 1945-1946 trial of Nazi elites before the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg received most attention, the follow-up 1948 
Einsatzgruppen trial before the American Military Tribunal in the same courtroom also found 
notice in Germany.  The Einsatzgruppen were four groups assigned letters – A, B, C, and D – 
scattered north-to-south along the invasion routes into the Soviet Union in 1941.  These 
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groups were then subdivided into smaller squads, or Einsatzkommandos.  The officer cadres 
of the Einsatzgruppen consisted early on of hardened SS men, ideologically indoctrinated 
with Nazi racial prejudice to sweep through newly occupied Soviet lands and clear them of 
dangerous elements.  Typically claiming military need, they murdered intellectuals, 
communist leaders, and Jewish men in the beginning of the invasion.  By August, they no 
longer hid behind pretence of military necessity, and began to murder Jewish women and 
children.  The Einsatzgruppen were responsible for the murder of approximately of 500,000 
to 800,000 Jews by the end of 1941 alone.121 
 In the postwar trials of selected Einsatzgruppen officers, emphasis focused on the 
elites.  This meant that the typical profile of an Einsatzgruppen officer became, for many 
Germans, a career SS man, who was motivated by the Nazi ideology of racial struggle to 
massacre Europe’s Jews.  These trials therefore did not raise the issue of “ordinary German” 
complicity in the crimes of the Einsatzgruppen because only hardened SS-officers were tried, 
not rank-and-file members.  Such a view was not wholly inaccurate, but it had a 
compartmentalizing effect on how Germans interpreted the mechanisms of the Holocaust.  
Those responsible for it, the camp guards and members of the Einsatzgruppen, were seen as 
hardened Nazis and aberrational Germans.   
In contrast, the Einsatzkommando Tilsit unit was by and large not comprised of SS 
ideologues.  In fact, significant differences separated Tilsit from the dominant view of 
Einsatzgruppen.  The unit’s name itself suggested such.  Most units had numbered names 
such as Einsatzkommando 1a, but the defendants’ came from the town in which it was 
stationed.  Atypically, Einsatzkommando Tilsit was created the day of the invasion as an ad 
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hoc execution squad.  Its membership largely consisted of randomly recruited rank-and-file 
police officers, civil servants, security forces, and border guards.  Few were hardened Nazis; 
many were not Nazis at all.  Yet, within a day they went from policemen to Holocaust 
perpetrators.  If the Einsatzgruppen trials in Nuremberg brought the officers’ crimes to 
attention, the Ulm trial had the potential to demonstrate the complicity of the rank-and-file, 
the ordinary Germans.122  
But therein lay the catch.  Although the average Einsatzkommando Tilsit member was 
not exceptionally motivated to carry out racial warfare, the average Einsatzkommando Tilsit 
member was not listed as a defendant in the Ulm case.  The prosecutors were hamstrung by 
the West German strict definition of murder.  Therefore they had the greatest chance of a 
successful conviction if they tried only those members who were ideologically motivated by 
anti-Semitism, those who volunteered to kill, those who went out of their way to kill innocent 
civilians.  Earlier, when Schüle was finishing the writing of the indictments, he was forced to 
conclude that fifteen other individuals, former members of Einsatzkommando Tilsit all, 
would not be included in the proceedings.123  Despite the massive reorganization of the 
investigation around the crimes, this would not be a trial of Tilsit after all, but a trial of its 
worst members. 
In this way, the message that the indictments conveyed perpetuated dominant 
conceptions of Holocaust perpetrators as atypical Germans.  The indictments were forced to 
point out the specific transgressions of each of the men.  These details were not included 
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because they were salacious or perversely intriguing.  Rather, these facts, more so even than 
the fact that each of these men participated in mass murder, allowed the investigators to make 
their cases.  But because this necessary focus emphasized extreme behavior, these defendants 
fit the expected profile of a Nazi criminal.  They were the dregs of the murder squad: 
excessive, violent, racist, and above all aberrational.   
They were, more specifically, Bernhard Fischer-Schweder, Werner Schmidt-
Hammer, Hans-Joachim Böhme, Werner Hersmann, Edwin Sakuth, Werner Kreuzmann, 
Harm Willms Harms, Gerhard Carsten, Franz Behrendt, and Pranas Lukys, alias Jakys.  As 
the remainder of this story concerns the prosecution of these men, an introduction to their 
pasts, how they escaped trial for so long, and what they were accused of will be useful. 
The first defendant was Bernhard Fischer-Schweder.  The charges against him did not 
become crystallized until the indictments.  As Police Director in Memel, he was accused of 
volunteering an officer, Werner Schmidt-Hammer, and twenty of his own men to join the 
Einsatzkommando.  Moreover, he offered to carry out the shootings in four different sites, 
“even though he had only been asked by the defendant Böhme to assign men to secure the 
shooting sites and guard the prisoners.”124  Fischer-Schweder himself was present at several 
of the executions and was accused of giving the order to shoot at the sites where his own men 
of the Schutzpolizei were the executioners.  He was accused of the murder of 711 civilians.125  
Second, Werner Schmidt-Hammer was a fairly straightforward defendant, as he 
admitted to carrying out the orders to lead the firing squads on at least four occasions.  More 
difficult to parse out was the motivation of this optometrist.  Of the defendants, he was the 
only never to have joined the Nazi party, but was drafted into service in the Schutzpolizei in 
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Memel.126  After the war, he omitted mention of his participation in mass murder, but did 
spend time in a prisoner of war camp before returning to optometry.  Though the second 
named defendant of the case, prosecutors deemed him a minimal flight risk, and he was the 
last to be arrested.127  He was accused of accessory to murder of several hundreds. 
Third, Hans-Joachim Böhme was one of the two main war criminals put on trial in the 
case.  He had joined the Nazi party shortly after it came to power in 1933 and the SS several 
months later.  Seemingly opportunistic in his motivations, he worked his way up the party 
ranks and managed to limp his way in the public sphere to a jurist degree.128   By 1941, he 
led the Staatspolizei in Tilsit and had reached the rank of SS-Hauptsturmführer.  The 
indictment alleged that in June 1941, Dr. Stahlecker, who was the head of the entire 
Einsatzgruppen A and died later during the war, asked Böhme and the defendant Werner 
Hersmann “to organize and lead Einsatzkommando Tilsit.”  Böhme took to the task and held 
the post until the unit was disbanded in October 1941.  He was “personally involved in most 
shootings.”129  After the war, he hid his Nazi membership and worked in agriculture for a 
number of years before using his jurist degree to find his post at the bank.  He was accused of 
the murder of 5,108 civilians.  
Fourth, Werner Hersmann was perhaps the most ideologically motivated and 
dedicated Nazi of the ten.  Unswervingly loyal, unendingly anti-Semitic, and unrepentant to 
the end, Hersmann according to the indictment was “along with Böhme responsible for the 
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actions of Einsatzkommando Tilsit in their entirety.”130  Born in 1904 in northwest Germany, 
he joined the Nazi party in 1930, the SS a year later.  He became leader of the SD in Tilsit, 
and along with Böhme created the Einsatzkommando unit.  During the selections for one 
execution, he ordered – against protests by fellow officers – a Jewish doctor who was treating 
wounded German soldiers to be taken and shot.  After the war, Hersmann never hid his Nazi 
affiliation.  After time in a POW camp, he was tried for crimes committed later in the war (he 
had been reassigned to Einsatzgruppen D) and spent the early 1950s in prison.131  In 1955, he 
began work for the quasi-clandestine organization Stille Hilfe (Silent Aid), whose primary 
aim was to help former Nazis escape postwar justice.132  Like Böhme, Hersmann was 
accused of the murder of 5,108 civilians. 
Fifth, Edwin Sakuth was born in 1909 in Tilsit.  He lived on the eastern border of 
Germany and spent his youth attending a Volksschule (German-language elementary school) 
in the then-Lithuanian city of Memel.  In 1931, he joined the Nazi party and in 1937 the 
SD.133  By the outbreak of war with the Soviet Union, he was put in charge of the Memel SD 
post, which operated under Hersmann in Tilsit.  He took part in at least four 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit shootings.  Early in the summer, when the policy was to murder 
Jewish men only, Sakuth chafed at the notion of keeping women and children alive, as they 
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were only “unnecessary mouths to feed.”134  He spent two years after the war in a camp for 
his Nazi membership, at which point he moved to West Germany.  He was arrested for the 
accessory to murder of several hundred. 
Sixth, Werner Kreuzmann, similar to Sakuth, spent his life in the eastern border 
region of Prussia.  He did not join the SS until later into the Nazi regime, but when he 
eventually did, he found himself working under Böhme in Tilsit at war’s outbreak.135  He 
participated in several shootings and was accused of leading the selection of victims on at 
least one occasion.136  Interned for several years following war’s end, Kreuzmann resettled in 
northern Germany, where he worked in the private sector.  He was accused of accessory to 
murder of several hundred. 
Seventh, the unfortunately-named Harm Willms Harms was the oldest of the ten 
defendants, born in 1892 in northwest Germany.  He joined the army in World War I and 
transitioned to the Freikorps after.  Harms worked in the Kripo, or detective office, in 
Hamburg until his unit, and he along with it, was brought into the Gestapo in 1937.  By 1941, 
he had moved to Tilsit and took part in several of the earliest shootings of Einsatzkommando 
Tilsit.  His postwar story paralleled Fischer-Schweder’s.  Though interned briefly for 
Gestapo membership, he became a shoemaker for a few years after the war until Article 131 
offered him the possibility of claiming his lost pension.  During his reapplication, authorities 
discovered that he joined the Nazi party in 1933 and rejected it.  However, and this points up 
the fragile conditions that led to Fischer-Schweder’s collapse, the matter did not go beyond 
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this, and Harms was not bothered until arrested in 1956.137  He was accused of accessory to 
murder of several hundred. 
Eighth, Gerhard Carsten, born in East Prussia in 1909, worked for Schupo Tilsit in the 
1920s until he joined the German army in the mid-1930s.  In 1937, he joined the Party and by 
the end of the decade returned to Tilsit, this time in the service of the Staatspolizei.138  
Carsten took part in several shootings and voluntarily reported and arrested Jews, even when 
“he was fully aware of what their fate would be.”139  He spent the end of the war through 
1950 in a British camp.  Despite imprisonment, he secured a job as a police detective in West 
Germany from 1953 until his arrest in 1957.140  He was accused of accessory to murder of 
several hundred. 
Ninth, Franz Behrendt, the youngest of the defendants, was born in 1912.  He worked 
in the border police near Memel at the outbreak of war and had been a party member since 
1939 and an SS officer shortly thereafter.141  He took part securing the area during shootings, 
and Behrendt’s knowledge of Lithuanian made him an important intermediary in 
disseminating Böhme’s orders to Lithuanian collaborators, such as the defendant Pranas 
Lukys.142  After a short time interned at war’s end, Behrendt spent the days until his 1957 
arrest working as an accountant near Hamburg.  He was accused of accessory to murder of 
several hundred. 
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Tenth and last, Pranas Lukys, alias Jakys, was the only non-German defendant.  
Lukys was born in 1900 into Russian-controlled Lithuania.  After World War I, Lithuania 
gained independence and Lukys became an ardent nationalist, joining the nascent military.143  
Following Soviet reoccupation in 1939, Lukys fled to the Nazi-controlled region near 
Memel.  When the Germans invaded in June 1941, Lukys returned.  As a “longtime 
committed opponent of communism,” Lukys eagerly worked with Nazi authorities, 
denouncing all Jews and communists known to him.  He earned Böhme’s attention and was 
put in charge of carrying out a number of arrests and executions.144  After the war, he fled 
into West Germany.  His family later moved to the United States, but Lukys stayed on in 
Germany.  At the time of his arrest, he was living off welfare.  He was accused of accessory 
to murder of several hundred. 
These were the men of Ulm.  They came from the backwaters of Prussia, the urban 
centers of the industrial Ruhr, the Lithuanian marches of the Baltic.  They were police 
officers, doctors, jurists, and career Nazis.  The ten, strangers before the war, found their 
histories intersecting during the summer of 1941.  With war’s outbreak, they joined together 
from various towns, units, and organizations to form the leadership of Einsatzkommando 
Tilsit.  During those three months, they carried out a program of mass murder that spanned 
only twenty-five kilometers but resulted in the deaths of an estimated 5,108.  Thereafter, their 
histories again diverged.  Nearly all of them made the decision to relocate after the war, 
either by force, fear of the Soviets, or a desire to cut ties with their pasts.  These decisions led 
them all to West Germany.  There they found a society in disarray and new possibilities for 
reintegration.  Each took advantage of his newfound anonymity, and each manipulated his 
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past for the gain of the present.  In Ulm on June 25, 1957, their histories once again 
converged. 
 
History Lessons in the Courtroom 
 When the courtroom’s doors opened and the trial against Fischer-Schweder and nine 
others began, nearly a year had passed since the indictments.  The publicity of the 
indictments had brought in new leads for the investigators to pursue.  Revisions were made to 
the charges against the men, and more precise details on the number of their victims 
emerged.  Scores of witnesses were expected, and their dates had to be set and travel 
arrangements made.  Additionally, each of the ten men retained his own counsel, and so the 
wall of paper thrown up by ten law firms created constant legal obstacles.  But by April 25, 
1958, the logistics were organized and the largest German trial of the postwar period started. 
 At eight o’clock that morning, the defendants began to arrive.  The courthouse sat to 
the north of the historic center of Ulm and not a mile from where Fischer-Schweder had 
spent the previous two years in a cell.  Outside of the imposing red-brown courthouse façade, 
journalists and photographers lined the steps that day waiting to see the men as they entered.  
For a quarter of an hour, the defendants were brought past them and into the courtroom, 
where they were seated – Böhme, Schmidt-Hammer, Sakuth, Carsten, and Kreuzmann to the 
left, Fischer-Schweder, Lukys, Harms, Hersmann, and Behrendt to the right.  They faced the 
center of the room, in profile to the spectators, attorneys, six men of the jury, and the judge.  
The men turned their faces from cameras and held up newspapers as they walked in.145  In 
the front of the room the accumulated investigative material was stacked, by this point 
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comprising several thousand pages and twelve bound volumes.  Next to this was a map of the 
border regions of Germany and Lithuania as of the summer of 1941.  Littering the map were 
dots plotting execution sites.146  The last time these men had seen one another, they were 
carrying out these murders. 
 A member of Schüle’s team made the opening remarks.  He explained that this was 
not “a show trial or a sensationalistic trial.”  Rather the trial was “better suited for inner 
reflection and contemplation,” as it was intended to explore “times of profound moral 
debasement and of full neglect of human worth.”  The prosecutors from the outset were 
explicit in their overtures not just to the members of the jury, but members of the German 
public.  They conceived of the trial as serving a broad educative function.  They were 
speaking to misconceptions about the Nazi past held in 1958.  There were aspects, they felt, 
that had not been fully considered and not yet reconciled. 
 After the prosecutors made their opening statement, Fischer-Schweder took the floor.  
The last time he had defended himself in court he was hoping for reinstatement as camp 
director; now, he would consider avoiding life in prison a successful outcome.  He gave his 
stock defense for his actions, describing himself as a disillusioned member of the Weimar 
generation.  “Party politics was completely broken,” he offered as explanation for his support 
of Nazism.  He avoided mention of shootings, as he had no intention of doing the 
prosecutors’ job for them.  From the attorneys’ table, Schmidt-Hammer’s lawyer was taking 
down his impressions of the defendants.  On Fischer-Schweder and his introductory remarks, 
the lawyer noted that he was “the type of person who would not tolerate anything from his 
subordinates.”147  He embodied the unrepentant Nazi, noted more for wearing sunglasses and 
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doodling Stars of David in the courtroom than affecting any semblance of remorse.148  
Fischer-Schweder’s statement concluded the first day.  Over the course of the week, each 
defendant entered his own opening remarks.149    
 For the first week after the opening statements, the defendants took the stand to 
testify.  One by one they turned on each other, attempting to diminish their own roles by 
increasing those of the others in the shootings.  The prosecutors’ success in this regard must 
be attributed at least in part to the strict isolation in which the men had all been kept since 
their arrests.  No two men shared the same prison, and so they were unable to coordinate 
their stories in any way prior to their testimony.150  The testimony tended to focus the 
responsibility on the three main defendants, Böhme, Hersmann, and Fischer-Schweder.  
Sakuth put blame on Fischer-Schweder, Hersmann did himself in, and when Harms took the 
stand it proved a “black day” for Böhme.151  But in the end, their refusal to hang together 
proved that they would all hang individually. 
 On May 9, the first day after the opening statements, Fischer-Schweder made an 
outburst in which he accused the courtroom of failing to meet the standards of “objectivity” 
and presuming innocence before guilt.  He evidently had not appreciated comments Sakuth 
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had made regarding his alcoholism, and so directed his anger at the courtroom.  The 
presiding judge did not take kindly to the accusations.  “Mr. Fischer-Schweder,” he said, 
“you are not leading these proceedings; you are here as a defendant before the court.  We 
make efforts to be objective, but we will not tolerate you interfering with the way these 
proceedings are conducted!”  Fischer-Schweder, whom the papers dubbed “l’enfant terrible” 
of the trial for the incident, had no choice but to sit back and hear the presentation of the case 
against him.152   
 On the fifteenth day of the trial, the witness testimony began.  In all, 172 were called 
to the stand or had their statements read.153  They represented a gamut of perspectives on 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit, from perpetrator to victim to expert.  As with the indictments, the 
witness statements began at the high level and worked their way down to the individual 
shootings.  During the first days of the witness statements, former leaders of the 
Einsatzgruppen explained how these groups were formed and how Tilsit became a post-
invasion solution to a manpower shortage.154  Military leaders and veterans of Operation 
Barbarossa were to describe the actual fighting involved in Lithuania.  They put an end to the 
defendants’ claims that partisans were targeted; as one officer recalled, “At this time [in the 
summer of 1941] there was not yet any partisan movement in Lithuania.”155  The prosecutors 
used a strategy aimed at debunking the lies the defendants had peddled in their opening 
remarks. 
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 Over two months into the trial, the Nazi propensity for paperwork caught up with the 
defendants.  Fischer-Schweder had already been dealt harm by his letters heaping praise on 
Himmler for noticing his birthday.  Hersmann was not aided by photographs that turned up of 
him and Hitler.156  But the presentation of the Ereignismeldungen UdSSR (operation reports 
USSR) towards the end of June trumped them all.  These reports had been used in the 
Nuremberg trials against the Einsatzgruppen but were largely forgotten by the mid-1950s.  
Mettler first came across them in the fall of 1956 during research at the Institut für 
Zeitgeschichte in Munich.157  By the beginning of 1957, the Ulm prosecutors received the 
remaining reports from the United Restitution Office in Frankfurt, an Allied-inspired 
organization for material compensation of Holocaust survivors.158 
 The Ereignismeldungen were daily reports filed by the Einsatzgruppen during the 
course of the war with the Soviet Union.  Generally not longer than five- to ten-pages, each 
consisted of the recent actions of the Einsatzkommandos as reported to their respective 
Einsatzgruppen.  These reports were then synthesized by Heydrich’s SS men at the 
Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Security Main Office) in Berlin, from where they were 
sent to Nazi and SS leaders.  In their content, these amounted to a list of towns, cities, and 
villages in the war zones of Eastern Europe and a corresponding list of civilians executed.  
These were the records of the Holocaust as perpetrated by the Einsatzgruppen.159 
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These documents provided crucial contemporary evidence against the defendants.  
Since these were the figures that Böhme and Hersmann would have reported to the 
Einsatzgruppe A leadership, they were tantamount to a confession to mass murder.  
Ereignismeldung #14, dated July 6, 1941, listed the first murders carried out by 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit.  It read:  
Three large cleansing operations [Säuberungsaktionen] were carried out by Tilsit and 
the following were shot 
 
in Garsden  201 Persons 
in Krottingen  214 Persons 
in Polangen  111 Persons.160 
 
Just five days later, Ereignismeldung #19 reported an additional eight Tilsit “cleansing 
operations,” which brought the number of Tilsit murders in only a three-week period to 1,743 
people.161  A week later the total rose to 3,302.162  When the Ereignismeldungen were 
presented before the court in Ulm, the newspapers expressed shock at this “bookkeeping of 
death.”163  Some even reprinted select copies of the reports.164   
Though valuable documents, the reports only went so far in making the prosecutors’ 
case.  The Ereignismeldungen contained only the key particulars of the more detailed reports 
sent from the Einsatzkommandos to the Einsatzgruppen.  The content of those original 
reports filed by Böhme and Hersmann, which ostensibly would have described in their own 
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words the nature of the executions, the provenance of the orders, and the carrying out of 
these orders, was unknown.  Despite the investigators’ efforts, these reports could not be 
located in 1958.165  
 The inclusion of the Ereignismeldungen was part of a wider strategy of 
contextualizing the murders.  The prosecutors used contemporary statements and orders by 
Nazi elite, including Himmler, Göring, and Stahlecker, the head of Einsatzgruppe A.  These 
types of records and evidence played an ambiguous role for the prosecutors.  On the one 
hand, by showing that the defendants were carrying out murder on behalf of the state, the 
case against them for murder became harder to make.  On the other hand, from the 
perspective of making clear the nature of the crimes and educating the public on the Nazi 
past, recreating the structures and decision-making processes of the Nazi regime effectively 
demonstrated the widespread complicity of many Germans in the Holocaust. 
 Despite the meticulous planning and preparation before the trial, it was not without 
incident.  Early on, court adjourned one afternoon because of Schmidt-Hammer suffered a 
heart attack, though he returned not long after.166  In mid-June, a witness and former SD 
officer was arrested for perjury in the courtroom.167  More seriously, after giving self-
incriminating testimony, former Gestapo Tilsit member Arthur Genath was arrested and 
formally charged.168  The next day, on July 5, 1958, he scrawled a note stating that he could 
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“no longer bear the shame” of his past.169  Genath then took his own life, “possibly by 
ingesting poison.”170  The media attention surrounding his death forced some questionable 
characters to raise their voices.  Letters were sent to the prosecutors, which blamed them for 
Genath’s death.  One man, who signed as “SS-Hauptsturmbannführer,” wrote, “The judges 
of today will be the defendants of tomorrow!  GERMANY AWAKE!!!!!!  WE ARE 
TAKING REVENGE!!!”171 
 Such outbursts were not uncommon during the trial.  Over its course, several hundred 
letters came into the offices of those associated with the trial from the general public.  Most 
of these, as with the letter urging Nazi revanchism, came from the far-right spectrum of Nazi 
apologetics.  They expressed anger at the German courts for prosecuting fellow Germans, 
labeling the prosecutors as traitors.  To some extent, one might expect the most vocal 
commentators on a trial to be from those who opposed it.  There were other letters, though, 
from citizens who were genuinely introspective about the implications of this trial.  Some 
appreciated that new crimes were coming to light, others that the trial might set the courts off 
on a slippery slope of overly-aggressive investigations.  These responses showed remarkable 
geographic diversity.  Though not surprising that many of these were hostile to the 
proceedings, that these responses came from all across Germany is revealing.  They suggest 
that the Ulm trial found widespread interest throughout the country.   
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 By the end of July, the witness statements came to an end.  After the testimony of 
German soldiers and Nazi officers, the few Lithuanian witnesses and Jewish survivors had 
testified.  On July 18, the handful of expert witnesses began their testimony.  These included 
experts on Lithuanian history, Lithuanian-Jewish relations, mechanisms of the Holocaust, 
and extant records of the Nazi regime.  They were rabbis and doctors, archivists and 
professors.172  Their testimonies buttressed the views already explored through the various 
witness statements and historical documents; their main objective was to further emphasize 
the framework in which the Tilsit mass murders were carried out.  With their statements, the 
presentation of the case against the defendants was complete.  All that remained were the 
statements of the lawyers and the defendants and the deliberation of the jury. 
 
“In the Name of the People” 
 The prosecution began its closing arguments at the start of August.  Schüle stood 
before the court and recapitulated the previous three months of the trial.  He reused 
photographs and images of the shooting sites, reminded the jury of the Ereignismeldungen 
revelations, and spoke on behalf of the victims.  He then recommended that the court give 
“exemplary sentences” to the defendants to underscore the seriousness of the trial and the 
crimes.  For four of the defendants – Fischer-Schweder, Böhme, Hersmann, and Lukys – 
Schüle recommended life imprisonment for murder.  These men were the leadership and the 
“masters of life and death” for thousands in Lithuania.173  The other six defendants were 
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accused of being accessories to murder.  The recommended sentence was fifteen years for 
Kreuzmann, ten years each for Harms and Behrendt, eight years for Carsten, seven years for 
Sakuth, and three years for Schmidt-Hammer. 
 Though the newspapers had already loudly reported that there was “no doubt” about 
the shooting of women and children in Lithuania, key questions did remain regarding the 
provenance of the orders for execution.  The prosecutors had not been able to disprove the 
defendants’ claims that orders originated from a higher office.  The Ereignismeldungen 
established that they carried out the murders, but not that they had initiated the orders.  In 
turn, the defendants conveniently suggested that the directives came from either Stahlecker in 
the Einsatzgruppe or even above him, from Heydrich and Himmler in Berlin.  None of these 
three survived the war or left behind available records to confirm or refute the defendants’ 
claims.  This was why the defense had tried so hard, in vain, to locate the reports Tilsit sent 
to the Einsatzgruppe A office. 
 The legal defense for the accused capitalized on this.  Across the board, they argued 
to differing extents the same version of the Befehlnotstand, or a defense of compulsion to 
follow orders.  Hersmann’s attorney Rudolf Aschenauer made the first defense.  Upon 
Hersmann’s arrest two years earlier, he had written to his “mother,” “brother,” and “sister” at 
the Nazi aid group Stille Hilfe, requesting Aschenauer’s defense.174  Aschenauer was an 
established and notorious Nazi defense specialist, involved in the Nuremberg trials and later 
to edit the memoirs of Adolf Eichmann.175  At one point during the proceedings, the other 
attorneys actually proposed putting Aschenauer on the stand as an expert witness on behalf of 
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the defendants; the court rejected the idea.176  By common agreement among the ten, 
Aschenauer was therefore selected to give the first of the final arguments, which framed 
those of the rest. 
 Aschenauer spent a “great part” of the defense discussing the larger question of the 
genocide and how it had been possible.177  For him, the defendants were the lowest level 
implementers of a genocide organized and perpetrated by “hundreds and thousands of 
bureaucrats in all service levels,” and which had been authorized in full by Hitler.  On the 
one hand, this meant that the men had been only following orders.  “If an SS-man, especially 
in times of war, did not carry out a superior’s order [Führerbefehl],” Aschenauer went on, 
“he put his life in immediate danger.”178  Since the prosecutors could find no hard evidence 
to contradict that the provenance of the orders came from above, Aschenauer felt on solid 
ground.   
On the other hand, Aschenauer used this argument to attempt to undermine the 
legitimacy of the court.  The premise challenged the idea that postwar law was being used 
retroactively to define crime under the Third Reich.  The case as made by the prosecutors had 
itself demonstrated that these executions were state-sanctioned; as such they could not have 
been considered illegal at the time.  One society’s good citizen was another’s murderer.  How 
then, Aschenauer argued, could the court pass judgment via “dual systems of law” without 
taking account of a “dual standard of morality”?  Since there was no possible way to 
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“distinguish between active participation and knowing acquiescence” in the crimes, he 
argued for Hersmann and the others to be acquitted.179 
Within this larger issue of applying postwar justice to wartime behavior and acting 
under compulsion to follow orders, each of the defense attorneys had to try to counteract the 
particular crimes attributed to the defendants – the accusations that purported to show a blood 
lust.  For example, Hersmann had been accused of being a brutish and ideological Nazi and 
of shooting the Jewish doctor against the petitions of the Wehrmacht soldiers for whom the 
doctor was caring.  Aschenauer argued first that Hersmann had not been a “staunch Nazi” but 
a “strict monarchist,” and second that there were no exemptions from shooting doctors, so 
Hersmann was only doing what he took to be his job.180  
Fischer-Schweder’s defense attorney, Dr. Marcushen, who replaced his earlier 
defense team earlier in the year, tried to explain to the jury the mindset of Fischer-Schweder, 
confused and over his head in Memel at the outbreak of war.  He reminded them that “to err 
is human, and such errors in war can have horrible consequences.”181  His sanctioning of the 
murder of 711 civilians had been an unfortunate lapse in judgment.  Fischer-Schweder 
moreover was “a child of his times” and his actions reflected more on these times than on the 
man himself.182  As such, he should be acquitted.  Schmidt-Hammer’s lawyer argued 
similarly that he had been in a difficult situation and did not realize the full implications of 
his actions.  Since “in contrast to all the other defendants, Schmidt-Hammer never joined the 
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Gestapo, nor the SS, nor the SD, nor even the Nazi Party or other organizations,” his 
argument proved the most persuasive.183   
 After several days of the attorneys’ final arguments, the defendants themselves had 
the final words of the trial.  They engaged in acts of limited contrition.  All expressed regret 
at having taken part in the shootings, but remained insistent that they did not know the extent 
of their actions at the time, did not realize they were targeting civilians and not partisans, did 
not realize they were murdering Jewish civilians for being Jewish.  As Fischer-Schweder 
stated, “Since 1945, I have spoken about my complicity in the appalling fate of our people 
and in the crimes of the former Führer because I have been a member of the Nazi movement 
since its beginning.  I did not know about the Vernichtungsbefehl [a 1941 order authorizing 
mass murder], but nevertheless in my conscience I feel responsible because I was there.”  
Hersmann succinctly expressed the limited nature of their final statements: “Today I know 
that it was murder.”184 
 On August 29, 1958, the courtroom read the final verdict.  After sixty days of trial, 
scores of witnesses, and hundreds of documents, the final judgment itself stretched on for 
almost three hundred pages and took the entire day to deliver.  “In the name of the people,” 
the court sentenced each of the ten men to prison.  All ten were convicted of accessory to 
murder.  Böhme and Hersmann were sentenced to respective fifteen- and ten-year sentences 
as accessories to 3,907 murders; Fischer-Schweder to ten years as accessory in 526; Lukys to 
seven years as accessory in 315; Kreuzmann to five years as accessory in 415; Harms to three 
years as accessory in 526; Behrendt to five years as accessory in 1,126; Carsten to four years 
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as accessory in 423; Sakuth to three years and six months as accessory in 526; and Schmidt-
Hammer to three years as accessory in 526.185 
 The outcome was a mixed success for the prosecutors.  To have tried ten men for 
mass murder and obtain convictions against all ten was unprecedented.  In previous German 
trials for crimes of the Holocaust, acquittals had been the norm.  In such trials with more than 
four defendants, acquittals had resulted for seventy-one out of seventy-eight defendants.186  
For example, a 1954 trial in Dortmund of twenty men accused of mass murder in the Warsaw 
Ghetto resulted in twenty acquittals.  To this extent, the outcome of the Ulm trial must be 
considered a success.  The convictions validated the new methods used in this case.  In 
particular, orienting the proceedings around the crimes and placing these into a rich historical 
context removed significant burden from the prosecutors.  A consistent marshalling of 
information, witnesses, and historical documents proved an effective means of counteracting 
even the best efforts of a Nazi defense specialist like Aschenauer.  In the game of cat and 
mouse between prosecutors and defendants, these new techniques gave the prosecutors a 
powerful but short-lived advantage. 
 On the other hand, the sentences meted out were overall less than those recommended 
by the prosecutors.  Four of the defendants – Böhme, Hersmann, Fischer-Schweder, and 
Lukys – had been accused of murder, but the court found them and the rest guilty of only 
accessory to murder.  The court cited that “the originators of the…physical destruction of all 
Jews without regard to the old and the sick and of the communists in the East are, in the 
opinion of the court, Hitler, Himmler, Heydrich, and those close to them.”187  This decision 
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implied that only the Nazi elite could be convicted of murder on these charges.  The 
argument put forth by Aschenauer and the others therefore was able to convince the court 
that the defendants were only the sharp end of the Nazi stick, implementers but not 
originators of the orders to commit mass murder.  As a result, they could not be held fully 
responsible for their actions. 
 Subsequent decades of historical research have also nuanced the outcome of the Ulm 
trial.  Though prosecutors tried in vain to locate the Tilsit reports, they were locked away in 
the Soviet sphere, only to come to light decades later.188  Their contents provided the 
evidence of murder that the prosecutors had wanted.  On June 24, 1941, the day of the 
Garsden shooting, Böhme and Hersmann noted that Einsatzgruppe A leader Stahlecker “gave 
his general approval to the cleansing operations in the area of the German border.”  The 
report went on to note that three executions of “Jewish citizens” were subsequently carried 
out in Garsden, Krottingen, and Polangen.  Later, Böhme and Hersmann encountered 
Himmler and Heydrich in the town of Augostowo.  The Nazi elite “were informed of the 
actions initiated by Stapo Tilsit and endorsed them in full.”189  This report suggested that the 
men had sought out Stahlecker’s approval for the executions – not that orders were given 
from him – and that the shootings were retroactively authorized by Himmler and Heydrich.  
Böhme and Hersmann had decided of their volition to murder Jewish civilians.  
 Without these reports, the men were found guilty of only accessory to murder and 
received substantially lower prison sentences.  In the end, though, Fischer-Schweder did 
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receive a life sentence.  After spending four years in prison since his arrest, Fischer-
Schweder died of a heart attack alone in his cell in 1960 at the age of 56.190   
 
Closing the Frontiers of the West 
 In the midst of the Ulm trial, a letter came addressed to prosecutor Nellmann in 
Stuttgart.  Its author was Gertrud Wechselmann, a Jewish woman from Lithuania, but then 
living in Freiburg.  She had read about the trial in a local newspaper and wrote to Nellmann:  
Did the members of Einsatzgruppe Tilsit [sic], who supposedly shot several 
thousands of Jews in the summer of 1941, also work in Libau, Latvia?  I’m interested 
in having this question answered because my husband, the Jewish attorney and notary 
Dr. Ernst Wechselmann, was shot on the beach in Libau in the summer of 1941.191 
 
For seventeen years after her husband’s death, Wechselmann had absolutely no idea who was 
responsible for his murder.  Her letter was one of many that came in from individuals with 
questions about the Nazi past.  Like Wechselmann’s, many of these inquiries were deeply 
personal.  By bringing attention to Einsatzkommando Tilsit, the trial invited the question, if 
over three months and a border strip of twenty-five kilometers Tilsit had murdered five 
thousand, how many more crimes lay uncovered?  How many criminals unpunished?  For 
Wechselmann and others, the Ulm trial raised hope that these questions might finally be 
answered.  
 The trial had also raised the expectations of Schüle and Nellmann.  There were many 
Tilsit members who were not included in the trial.  Their investigations had brought to light 
other shootings and units unrelated to the defendants.192  For these prosecutors and their 
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investigative staffs, bringing these criminals to justice could not be a process left to others; a 
central solution was needed.  Nellmann and Schüle began to pressure the federal government 
to create an agency devoted exclusively to the investigation of Nazi criminals.193  
Sympathetic journalists joined in, suggesting that the Ulm trial be a call for greater 
prosecutorial zeal.194  The government agreed and created the Zentrale Stelle der 
Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärungen nationalsozialistischer Gewaltberbrechen 
(Central Office of the State Justice Ministries for the Investigation of National Socialist 
Crimes of Violence) in December 1958.195  Schüle was appointed its first president and the 
headquarters were based near his offices in Ludwigsburg.  He brought along members of the 
Ulm investigative team to aid him.  Their talents earned them the post, but Fischer-Schweder 
gave the opportunity to showcase them. 
 If the outcome of the Ulm trial showed the potential for such an agency, the wider 
legal context of the day gave the impetus for its creation.  The current statute of limitations 
on all crimes committed under the Third Reich other than murder – in its strict “thirst for 
blood” legal definition – was set to expire in 1960.196  Since the prosecutors had not even 
been able to convict any of the ten at Ulm of murder despite the plethora of evidence aligned 
against them, such an expiration would have placed thousands beyond the reach of West 
German justice.  The government eventually extended the statute of limitations and modified 
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this definition of murder, but prosecutors in 1958 could not have known this.  They operated 
under the assumption that if Nazi criminals were to come to justice, there remained only a 
short window of time for these investigations and trials to commence.  The foundation of the 
Zentrale Stelle within a matter of months highlights this sense of concern on the part of the 
government.   
 Though a positive step for the prosecution of war criminals, the Zentrale Stelle did 
have severe limitations placed on it.  First, the agency was authorized to launch 
investigations, but had to hand over the cases to the relevant states for prosecution.  Second, 
the Zentrale Stelle could only investigate criminal actions that took place outside of the 
Federal Republic.  Third, crimes involving members of the Wehrmacht were explicitly 
outside of the organization’s purview.  Taken together, these limitations meant that the 
crimes investigated primarily involved the murder of Jews outside of Germany by Nazi 
officials.197  As a result, the Zentrale Stelle offered a forum for investigations, but confined 
this discussion to a traditional framework for interpreting crimes of the Holocaust: they were 
the actions of hardened Nazis, not ordinary Germans, that occurred outside the borders of 
Western Germany and therefore largely without the knowledge or approval of the average 
German citizen. 
Despite such limitations, the Zentrale Stelle, with an initial staff of only eleven 
lawyers, made an immediate impact.  Schüle used all records available to him.  He visited the 
vast volumes of captured Nazi documents held in Alexandria, Virginia.  He and his staff 
spent several weeks going through these, amassing a list of thousands of individuals to 
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investigate.198  Since a prosecutor needed only to begin an investigation in order to avoid the 
expiring statute of limitations, these early months of the Zentrale Stelle led to a massive 
increase in active investigations.  In the ensuing decades, the agency brought thousands of 
Nazis to justice.   
The creation of the agency acted as a bellwether of wider changes.  Already seen in 
this paper has been the growing number of organizations and archives interested in the Nazi 
past and finding those who had escaped justice.  With the Ulm trial and a series of other 
smaller but high profile cases, the antennae of the public became more sensitively attuned to 
the crises of failed reintegration.199  Increasingly, these changes to the cultural, 
organizational, professional, and legal spheres cleaned up the image of West Germany.  The 
Cold War was in full swing and Germany increasingly a battle ground of propaganda.  Many 
records remained locked away in East Germany and other Soviet-controlled countries, only 
to see light when politically expedient—for example, to reveal a prominent West German as 
a former Nazi member.  Schüle himself fell victim to such a Soviet attack, when it was made 
public that he had concealed aspects of his own Nazi past.200  Though cleared of any wrong-
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doing, the issue forced his resignation and brought an embarrassing end to the first 
presidential tenure of the Zentrale Stelle.   
What all of these changes meant, moreover, was that the Fischer-Schweder story 
became increasingly bound to its time and place.  By the 1960s, it would have been far more 
difficult for Fischer-Schweder to be active in the service of the state, especially in such a 
public post.  Schmidt-Hammer, Hersmann, Böhme, Kreuzmann, Carsten, Behrendt, Sakuth, 
Harms, and Lukys at some point would have been subject to questions about the past, a past 
about which the public and the government were increasingly well informed.  The cataclysm 
of World War II had thrown the entire country into disarray in the decade after, but slowly it 
all began to resettle.  Order returned to the chaos and the former Nazis who thrived off the 
latter found it harder to hide in the former.  The frontiers that defined the postwar period of 
West Germany, in which no questions were asked and anyone was who they claimed to be, 
were coming to an end. 
Justice at Ulm may have been slow in coming and insufficient in its sentences, but the 
creation of knowledge and the judicial attempt to work through Nazi crimes were part of a 
necessary process for West Germany in order to find its own way forward.  In 1971, thirteen 
years after Gertrud Wechselmann’s letter to Nellmann and thirty years after her husband’s 
murder, she finally got her answer, and men responsible for the mass shootings in Libau, 
Latvia – members of Einsatzkommando 2b and local police units – were sentenced to prison 
thanks to an investigation undertaken by the Zentrale Stelle.201 
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Appendix: Historiography 
 This paper has worked within and attempted to intervene in several historiographical 
trends.  First is the narrow body of work done on the Ulm trial itself.  To date, no full history 
of the trial has been published.  A recent museum exhibit in Ulm in 2008 for the fiftieth 
anniversary of the trial was accompanied by a series of public lectures and a well-crafted 
pamphlet history on the trial.202  The pamphlet and exhibit did an admirable job portraying 
the development of the trial, but its emphasis, as with the lectures, tended to lean on the 
legacy of the Ulm trial.  This trend has dominated the scholarship of the trial as well.  Marc 
von Miquel has perhaps written on the trial in the most depth, and though he briefly engages 
with Fischer-Schweder’s postwar life, his main aim is to use the Ulm trial instrumentally in 
showing the growing seriousness with which West Germany faced its Nazi past.203  The Ulm 
trial, moreover, is subsumed in his larger project of showing ongoing German attempts to 
define the place and role of former Nazis in the West German successor state. 
Historians have tended to follow this example.  They generally agree on the 
significance of the Ulm trial as a necessary step in coming to terms with the past.  In 
particular, the emphasis is on the cultural legacy of the trial and the intensive media coverage 
surrounding it.  Jeffrey Herf provides a useful example of this conventional historical 
narrative in his 1996 work, Divided Memory: 
In 1958 in a trial of an Einsatzgruppe in Ulm, the West German public first faced the 
cost of the integration and amnesty policies of the early 1950s.  A former police 
director…was convicted and sentenced to a long prison term.  Journalists, liberal 
politicians, lawyers, and intellectuals now called for a systematic examination and 
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judicial prosecution of Nazi war crimes and crimes against humanity.  The era of 
democratization based on silence and integration was coming to an end, and a more 
intensified period of West German judicial confrontation with Nazi crimes was 
beginning.204 
 
Herf’s portrayal of the Ulm trial comprises only a paragraph in his path-breaking book on 
German memory after the war, yet the narrative carried a substantial historical weight.  
Similar sentiments are expressed in numerous other postwar histories of West Germany.205 
The result is twofold.  First, the Ulm trial is typically treated as a cause of later 
changes and has not been given sufficient attention in itself a result of shifting social 
variables.  This essay has therefore sought to reorient the focus on the Ulm trial.  By 
examining its origin and evolution, the chain of events leading to the Zentrale Stelle and 
postwar resurgent interest in crimes of the Nazi past themselves come to be seen as more 
contingent than generally assumed.  Second, the outcome of the trial has been discussed in 
cultural terms.  This essay has intentionally avoided extensive discussion of the cultural or 
media response to the trial in order to emphasize the underappreciated legal legacy of the 
trial.  Certainly there was a cultural impetus behind the creation of the Zentrale Stelle, but 
without the developments, skills, and networking that went into the Ulm trial, this agency 
would have been unimaginable. 
 The second relevant historiography concerns postwar trials.  Here the scholarship has 
tended to leapfrog the 1950s, focusing on the Allied trials of Nazi elite in Nuremberg in the 
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late 1940s, on one hand, and on the spurt of prominent trials that began in the 1960s, on the 
other.  As mentioned, the Ulm trial fit into this narrative as a kind of shorthand for bridging 
the gap between the perceived period of prosecutorial dormancy in the 1950s to the 
resurgence in the 1960s.  Two recent works by Devin Pendas and Rebecca Wittmann on the 
Frankfurt Auschwitz trials from 1963-1965 typify this instrumentalizing of the Ulm trial.206  
This paper has attempted to explain the steps by which this trial came about; but more than 
that, it is hoped that by conducting a full history of the trial, this fallow period of 
prosecutorial indifference to crimes of the Third Reich is foreshortened.  The processes that 
led to the 1958 trial were underway as early as 1954, and so the notion of a dormant 1950s 
needs to be reexamined. 
 On this point, as well, the paper engages a third historiography, and this broadly 
considers West German Vergangenheitsbewältigung, or attempts to come to terms with the 
past.  This umbrella category includes the historiographies already discussed – those of the 
Ulm trial and other postwar trials – but includes the wider social, cultural, and political 
efforts to reconcile the present to the Nazi past.  Jeffrey Herf’s Divided Memory was one of 
the major works to consider how both Germanys sought to reshape and legitimize the present 
state through constructions of the past.  In the West, these efforts in the initial postwar period 
tended to sidestep the Nazi period, creating “multiple restorations” of the pre-Nazi German 
governments.  In this situation, the Adenauer government faced a choice of “either memory 
and justice or democracy but not both.”207  In order to move forward, Herf argued, West 
Germany was forced to delay justice.  A second major work, Norbert Frei’s 
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Vergangenheitspolitik (translated into English as Adenauer’s Germany) sought to describe 
the governmental debates over how to socially integrate members of the Nazi regime.208  As 
with Herf’s account, Frei emphasizes that postwar Germany was a forward-looking state, too 
pressed with the needs of the present to engage in concerns over the past. 
 Herf and Frei have inspired a wide literature, most of which has confirmed their 
interpretation of the postwar period as dominated with concerns for the future and beliefs of 
victimization in the past.209  This narrative concludes with a cultural reawakening in the 
1960s that caused Germany to seriously consider for the first time how the Nazi period and 
the Holocaust in particular were possible.  The work in this paper has in this regard acted as a 
case study of these changes taking place in 1950s West Germany, suggesting that these 
developments may have been more contingent than initially thought.  The story of Bernhard 
Fischer-Schweder conforms to many aspects of Frei’s Vergangenheitspolitik, which 
demonstrates a German society initially unable and even unwilling to confront the Nazi era.   
His downfall, however, demonstrates that these wider processes of social change 
occurred to large extent via connections made through various pockets of progress.  
Organizations, prosecutors, media, and members of the public contributed to the trial’s 
origins, development, and outcome.  The 1950s was not a decade of German obsession with 
the Nazi past, but nor was it, as this essay has shown, a moment of total amnesia.  Aspects of 
society were beginning to come around to a more historically self-aware understanding of the 
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German past.  In this way, a nuanced and – above all – decentralized view of how West 
Germany came to confront the Nazi past emerges.  
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